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Emerging problems often surprise lawmakers and agency officials and result in rapid, 
reactive governance. The political attention an issue receives may or may not be 
sufficient to resolve the emergent problem and in many cases may be an over-reactive 
auto-response dictated by public opinion and issue salience.  
This thesis examines the emergence of congressional post-crisis attention and uses 
statistical analysis to demonstrate the primary characteristics that influence the 
emergence of attention pertaining to a crisis. Furthermore, this thesis has established a 
repeatable model whereby an emerging crisis can be evaluated by its characteristics to 
predict the likely reaction of government. This thesis uses quantitative methods to 
simplify the complexity posed by future crises in an effort to avoid sporadic governance. 
Recognition of the potential for reactiveness in decision making may be the key step to 
creating a culture of controlled, proactive agenda setting.  
The merits of this research transcend the organizational or political future of a 
single entity or specific stakeholder. Ideally, this work will provide an alternate method 
to observe and study the dynamics of emerging crises and episodic attention, providing 
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Emerging problems often surprise lawmakers and agency officials and result in rapid, 
reactive governance. Stakeholders and special interest groups, galvanized by widespread 
concern and common purpose hasten policy—such was the case in the creation of a 
homeland security organization after September 11, 2001. In other cases, such emerging 
problems only garner a scant amount of attention and may or may not result in any 
political consideration. The political attention an issue does receive may or may not be 
sufficient to resolve the emergent problem and in many cases may be an over reactive 
auto-response dictated by public opinion and issue salience.  
This study illustrates there are specific variables and distinctive characteristics of 
crises as they emerge that enable and accelerate the emergence of post-crisis attention 
and give an issue the power to compel change in public and political opinion. The 
research of this study demonstrates there are specific combinations of forces more likely 
to result in or influence emergent attention than others. In addition, it shows an 
interrelationship of characteristics of crises to what Dr. Anthony Downs termed the issue-
attention cycle and the emergence of political opportunity1 and what Dr. John Kingdon 
terms the policy window.2  
This thesis examines the emergence of post-crisis congressional attention and 
demonstrates the primary characteristics that influence the emergence of attention using 
statistical analysis and fundamental formulas of physics. This thesis will show that black 
swans, wicked problems, and complex domestic and social issues are an outcome of the 
crises’ characteristics and result in episodic attention differently. Furthermore, this thesis 
examines the degree of influence specific characteristics, such as economic impacts and 
fatalities have on major crises, such as natural disasters, and establishes a 
                                                 
1 Anthony Downs, “Up and Down with Ecology: The ‘Issue-Attention Cycle,’” Public Interest 28 
(summer 1972): 39–50, http://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/teaching/articles/Downs_Public_Interest_1972.pdf, 
41.  
2 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2003), 
170; Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner, The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes 
Problems (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 20. 
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multidimensional model of emerging crises using probabilities, laying the bedrock to 
define new theoretical models of episodic attention in Congress. 
By applying quantitative methods, this study helps simplify the complexity posed 
by future crises through estimation of the value of crises and their potential outcomes. 
The ability to evaluate emerging crises based on their “value” enables researchers to 
postulate risk of possible outcomes in an effort to avoid reactive, sporadic governance. 
Recognition of the potential for reactiveness in governance may be the important step to 
creating a culture of controlled proactive agenda setting. The merits of this research 
transcend the organizational or political future of a single entity or specific stakeholder. 
Ideally, this work will provide an alternate method to observe and study the dynamics of 
emerging crises and episodic attention, creating the opportunity to analyze, comprehend, 
and then react differently. 
A. METHODOLOGIES OF ANALYSIS 
This study set out to successfully prove the hypothesis questioning the 
characteristics of crises and their influence on subsequent attention. Emerging attention in 
this work was examined by applying Dr. Larry Gerston’s qualitative characteristics, 
combined with other contemporary theories, to a sample of 25 crises quantitatively. 
Gerston postulated that specific characteristics of crises, such as intensity, gestation, 
resources, and size, influence how people think about crises as they occur.3 For this 
study, the sample of crises was evaluated, determining for each the mathematical mean of 
congressional attention annually over the crises’ entire duration, how rapidly attention 
emerged, and the total number of hearings. Aggregated data on congressional hearings 
was then compared against the assigned numerical value of the characteristics as they 
applied to each crisis. By assigning quantitative values in place of qualitative descriptors 
for each characteristic, crisis values were derived that were successfully correlated to the 
degree of congressional attention an emerging crisis received, measured in congressional 
hearings. Reviewing over 10,800 congressional hearings from 1942 to 2012, the use of 
                                                 
3 Larry Gerston, Public Policy Making: Process and Principles, 2nd ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 
2004), 25.  
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statistical method multivariate and regression analysis established that congressional 
attention is indeed influenced by the characteristics of emerging crises, that not all crises 
prompt the same degree of attention, and produced several other significant findings 
related to the power of emergent crises, all of which expand the current body of 
knowledge of issue-attention. 
Consistently, findings of the analysis underscored the relationship between crises’ 
characteristics and emergence of congressional attention, both in the total amount of 
attention and rate of emergence. Based on findings, there now remains no question that 
characteristics such as the size of an event, the intensity and rate of emergence, the 
resources required to solve the problem, and the cause and culpability all contribute to the 
emergence of the issue-attention cycle and subsequently the policy window post-crisis. 
B. OUTCOME OF ANALYSIS 
The following are the outcome of the analysis:  
1. When all crises in the sample were compared against their rate of 
emergence and total crisis-value, the 25 crises grouped into three distinct clusters: black 
swans, wicked problems, and social crises. The highest value cluster represents the top 20 
percent of all crises in the sample, indicating a natural tendency of chaotic occurrences to 
organize in an orderly Pareto distribution. 
2. As the characteristics of a crisis develop over time in their value (e.g., 
their intensity, the resource impacts), the degree of attention changes. One example 
would be in the case of immigration where a notable transition in intensity and resources 
consequently increased the issue’s degree of attention from approximately 10 hearings 
annually to nearly 60 hearings annually—over 400 percent. This alone validates the 
primary hypothesis of this thesis in that as the value of a crisis changes, so does the 
congressional attention.  
3. There is a high level of statistical significance, confirmed by secondary 
testing, supporting the hypothesis that specific characteristics, such as intensity, gestation, 
resources, size, and fault, influence the emergence of congressional attention post-crisis. 
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4. Validation testing for black swans revealed a statistically significant 
correlation between the value of the crises’ characteristics and the total number, average 
number of congressional hearings, and the rate of acceleration of attention. Correlation 
and significance were meaningfully higher than when included in the sample of all crises. 
This fact indicates clearly not all crises correlate in the same manner.  
5. The results of this study indicate characteristics of crises affect black 
swans, wicked problems, and social crises each differently. Analysis indicates wicked 
problems are generally less affected by characteristics than social crises and black swans. 
6. Characteristics such as intensity and cause, when occurring independently, 
are not as influential on emerging crises as other characteristics or when acting 
synergistically. 
7. There is a relationship of high statistical significance between economic 
loss and natural disasters. Likewise, there is a statistically significant relationship, though 
to a slightly lesser degree, of fatalities to natural disasters. However, as noted in the 
analysis of all crises above, the intensity (degree of economic impact and fatalities) alone 
does not affect the crisis as strongly as when accompanied by other factors.  
8. Eight in 10 major natural disasters occur within eight years of a previous 
event, with only 20 percent of major natural disasters occurring greater than nine years 
from the previous. Of these occurrences, there is a high probability a major natural 
disaster resulting in significant congressional attention will occur at least once every 5.4 
years. It is likely the number of hearings will total near 11, depending on the damage and 
number of fatalities among other factors. 
9. Each major crisis attention cycle lasts approximately two to three years. In 
nearly all cases, the decline in attention from its highest point will be approximately 67 
percent from the previous year.  
In defining the patterns of episodic attention and political opportunity in crisis, 
there is an underlying ethical risk present. Significant crises often necessitate the re-
examination, re-assessment, and, in some cases, re-structuring of the status quo political 
arrangements. An acute understanding of the transfer of attention and punctuated shifts of 
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policy can better enable the astute, savvy politician to influence the attention cycle for 
gain, or it may likely present opportunity to not invest where it may not appear to be 
lucrative to do so for the long term (i.e., there is no potential for growth or long-term 
political opportunity). There is a risk created through this study that one might be more 
advantaged to align oneself with the emerging crisis likely to be most salient and 
repudiate those that are not. 
The more concise defining of reactive congressional attention enables anticipatory 
governance and thus limits reactive governance post-crisis. This key benefit of theoretical 
advancement adds new considerations to the current process of political agenda 
development as it pertains to the generation and acceptance of policy alternatives. 
Currently, political opportunism typically caused by reactive attention of Congress results 
in fertile opportunities for policy supporters to champion preferred solutions or attention 
to particular issues, and provides opportunity for key political figures to initiate 
punctuated growth of government.4 This feature of reactive governance is precisely what 
the theory of anticipatory governance is designed to prevent. Advocates of particular 
policy solutions know that when the policy window is open, it is open only for a short 
time. They also know the policy window is the sine qua non of money; where there is 
money, there is potential for shifts or shoring up of power. There is a conflict dynamic 
within the political reform craft by those within the elite intent on conservative reforms to 
protect status quo, and those intent on more liberal reform of institutional arrangements. 
Changes in policy goals, institutions, and polity settings influence revenue flow, thus 
influencing power distribution. 
This thesis has established a foundation to better understand the scope and 
duration of attention post-crisis. This understanding enables efforts to develop a model to 
support anticipatory governance of catastrophic events. Based on the data analysis in this 
study, it is clear events will continue to occur with regularity and that events are 
somewhat predictable in their scope and scale, as is legislative reaction to such crises. By 
using statistical analysis and probability models, this thesis demonstrates a viable method 
                                                 
4 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 99. 
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of clarifying emergent crises. The results of analysis better define the problem space and 
second order effects of a catastrophe and help mitigate reactive governance that tends to 
occur as a result of emerging crises. This is an area continually deserving of more 
scholarly attention. The subject covered in this study is merely a foundation; yet, it has 
proven the depths to which this subject can be mined.  
There are several areas regarding issue-attention that should be considered for 
further study, including: The duration of the issue-attention cycle and whether prolonged, 
heightened awareness creates a proportionate increase in negative sentiment. An 
understanding of the issue-attention cycle and its consequences will more fully aid 
emergency managers, response professionals, and presidential staff in preparing both 
short- and long-term risk-management messaging and strategies. Strategic 
communications of this nature may be that which is communicated post-crisis 
intentionally to appropriately frame narratives of local and state officials, the public, and 
media. 
Defining the emergence, timing, and duration of the issue-attention cycle to more 
accurately predict the policy window. Although contemporary research does examine 
what contributes to the emergence of issues, quantifying the timing and duration of issue-
attention may prove a far more challenging task. Additional study should be undertaken 
to determine the re-emergence of the policy window without a triggering event. This 
dynamic occurs after most major crises and relates to congressional attention, social 
media attention, and public opinion polling—as shown in this thesis.  
By accepting new theories on legislative attention resulting from problem 
emergence, especially theories that better establish what causes, shapes, and retains 
episodic attention, institutions will be challenged to react more predictably. The 
competing narratives in this effort will be those that suggest history cannot foretell 
anything about future events, nor can the reaction to previous unpredictable events 
portend anything about future behavior. This is erroneous, myopic thinking. Evidence 
reinforces, with a high degree of statistical significance, certain crises correlate strongly 
to specific reactions in legislature.  
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A better understanding of the economy of crisis, the probability, and the risks 
posed by a crisis to a community better allows for arguments of return on investment and 
intentional, strategic messaging. By building a comprehensive landscape of a variety of 
dissimilar crises, one can see the patterns of attention emergence, calculate probability of 
occurrence and size of events, and develop programs that represent “over the horizon” 
preparedness and mitigation activities by investing in the necessary resilience needed to 
combat the ill effects of crisis. When the behavioral aspects of issue-attention post-crisis 
are known to decision makers, it should be more evident that an initiating event should 
not be needed to pressure change. This changes the requirements of Kingdon’s tenants,5 
maybe even changes the notion of a policy window.  
 
                                                 
5 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 170; Jones and Baumgartner, The Politics of 
Attention, 20. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Hypothesis: There are specific variables that enable and accelerate the emergence 
of attention post-crisis and give an issue the power to compel change in public and 
political opinion. The hypotheses driving this inquiry endeavors to demonstrate through a 
repeatable model a pattern in emerging crises of specific forces that more strongly 
influence emerging problems than others. Research deduces there are specific 
combinations of forces such as size, intensity, timing, resource draw, fault, and cause that 
are more likely to result in or influence emergent issues than others.  
Every once in a while, there are certain events—catastrophic occurrences—that 
alter how we live and how we behave. These punctuating events, unexpected occurrences 
resulting in periods of measurable reactivity, have the power to influence what people 
pay attention to and ultimately determine the shape of government. Since September 11, 
2001, the federal government has spent over $800 billion on homeland security and 
related enterprises, $300 billion more than Roosevelt’s total New Deal program adjusted 
for inflation.1 Similar to the rapid growth of government after the Great Depression, there 
has been significant punctuated growth in government and expense to bolster security 
programs across the world.  
Rahm Emanuel famously observed, “In crisis is opportunity.”2 What he did not 
suggest was that in opportunity is also displacement; the new most important issue 
replaces what was once important. After crisis, the polity reactively jumps from 
                                                 
1 Total New Deal program cost of $36.36 billion adjusted for inflation in 2014 equaled $500.12 
billion. “CPI Calculator Information,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, accessed May 18, 2015, 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/community_education/teacher/calc/; Katrina Vanden Heuvel and Eric 
Schlosser, “America Needs a New Deal,” The Nation, September 27, 2008, 
http://www.thenation.com/article/america-needs-new-new-deal.  
2 Gerald F. Seib, “In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama,” The Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122721278056345271.  
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metaphorical cliff to cliff. Within the Department of Homeland Security, this has resulted 
in an environment of shifting priorities and perpetual instability.3  
Harvard professor and paleontologist Stephen Gould suggests in the evolution of 
species, radical growth is a result of episodic events and/or catastrophic changes that 
cause indiscriminate disruption and consequently result in sharp, punctuated changes.4 
His theory suggests rather than the species adapting through micro evolution (e.g., small 
adaptations over time), adaptation of species occur all at once due to significant macro 
events that change the fabric of ecosystems and force large-scale adaptation. Gould’s 
theory, aptly called punctuated equilibria, has been applied in the political science 
community to help explain the episodic nature of growth in government.5 This thesis 
endeavors to examine the episodic nature of governance, namely what causes Congress to 
focus on certain emerging crises yet not others. It also looks at what conditions or 
characteristics of a crisis become the “tipping point,” resulting in the rapid emergence of 
attention that establishes the fertile ground for legislative change. 
The underpinning priority of this thesis is to contribute to the body of knowledge 
on emerging problems by mapping problems as they emerge and subsequent emergence 
and decline of political opportunity, termed the “policy window.”6 Dr. John Kingdon 
theorizes the policy window, when the result of a crisis, is a quickly fleeting opportunity 
to initiate legislation not otherwise on the political agenda. Kingdon attributes the staying 
power of the policy window in part to issue attention- or the public’s ability to remain 
focused on a single problem after emergence.7 
                                                 
3 Peter May, Ashley Joachim, and Joshua Sapotichne, “Policy Regime and Governance: Constructing 
Homeland Security” (presented at the 10th Public Management Research Association Conference, Ohio 
State University, 2009), http://tinyurl.com/qfz7a4h, 32.  
4 Stephen Jay Gould, Punctuated Equilibrium (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 
http://site.ebrary.com/id/10318436, 39, 82–115.  
5 Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner, The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes 
Problems (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 19.  
6 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2003), 
165–169, 203. 
7 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 170; Jones and Baumgartner, The Politics of 
Attention, 20.   
 3 
This thesis demonstrates the importance of certain characteristics in emerging 
crises such as an event’s size and impact, and how these characteristics influence the 
public and polity’s prioritization of problems. For the purposes of this thesis, the term 
“crisis” is defined as “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values 
and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances 
necessitates making vital decisions.”8  
Dr. Larry Gerston posits specific characteristics of crises contribute to issues 
reaching the public agenda. In the same manner, combinations of variables may create a 
synergistic effect, resulting in varying levels of attention to emerging problems. Consider 
briefly the attention a devastating hurricane or tornado garners compared to the number 
of deaths on U.S. highways each day. Although one claims the lives of tens of thousands 
over the course of any given year (when considered cumulatively, over twice the 
population of Rhode Island since 1950), the other is tragic (sudden), claiming its lives up 
front. The atypical nature of the natural disaster, coupled with its concentrated force, 
causes a more acute reaction; the event becomes seemingly more urgent.  
Punctuated attention caused by the episodic nature of emerging problems tends to 
result in extreme and rapid reactions of officials and thus causes the subsequent 
displacement of other issues on the public agenda.9 By more fully understanding 
emerging problems, what influences these issues, and what reaction they may garner, 
agencies, such as Department of Homeland Security, can more fully align themselves 
post-crisis.10 This thesis is crafted considering the necessity to more fully demarcate the 
future disciplines of homeland security and guide the reaction of governance post-crisis.  
As theorized by Gerston and others, emerging problems command attention by 
their salience (how novel the occurrence), their intensity (how rapidly they emerge), and 
                                                 
8 Arjen Boin, The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2.    
9 Ibid. 
10 Jones and Baumgartner, The Politics of Attention, 4–5. 
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the resources the problem demands (what will it “cost” to solve).11 In discussing the 
influence of these variables, specifically their combined influence on emerging crises, Dr. 
Gerston explains, “The more the categories grow in tandem, the more likely that they 
collectively will present a triggering mechanism.”12  
Furthermore, it is known the initial reaction to emerging problems is based on two 
things. First is pre-established bias, such as social construction (how the problem is 
framed), which contributes directly to defining the span (life cycle) of issue-attention. 
Second is by the public and thus polity’s reaction to the emergent problem.13 Compelling 
work has been conducted in the area of psychological bias in organizations and politics, 
suggesting that even when crisis poses a clear danger, political actors may do nothing 
until it is too late.14  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
The primary question this thesis will seek to answer is:  
Do specific variables, such as scope, intensity, timing, resources, cause, and fault 
enable and accelerate the emergence of attention post-crisis and give an issue the power 
to compel change in public and political opinion? 
Other questions this thesis seeks to answer: 
• When does the attention fade?  
• How long is the cycle of attention (policy window)?  
This thesis poses and will provide evidence to support several hypotheses: 
 
 
                                                 
11 Larry Gerston, Public Policy Making: Process and Principles. 2nd ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 
2004), 25; Dominic Johnson and Elizabeth Madin, “Paradigm Shifts in Security Strategy: Why Does It 
Take Disasters to Trigger Change?” Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World, ed. 
Raphael D. Sagarin and Terrence Taylor (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 226.  
12 Dr. Larry Gerston, email correspondence, October 17, 2014.  
13 David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb, The Politics of Problem Definition: Shaping the Policy 
Agenda (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 10. 
14 Dominic Johnson and Simon Levin, “The Tragedy of Cognition: Psychological Biases and 
Environmental Inaction,” Current Science 1, no. 11 (2009): 1593–1603.   
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1. For the influence of combined characteristics on crises: 
Null hypothesis (H0): Specific characteristics such as intensity, gestation, 
resources, size, and fault, when combined are not statistically significant 
contributors to the emergence of congressional attention post-crisis. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Specific characteristics, such as intensity, gestation, 
resources, size, and fault, when combined are contributors to the 
emergence of congressional attention post-crisis. 
2. For the influence of characteristics on crises independently: 
Null hypothesis (H0): The characteristics size, resources, and fault, when 
considered independently are not statistical significant contributors to the 
emergence of congressional attention post-crisis. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The characteristics size, resources, and fault, when 
considered independently are statistical significant contributors to the 
emergence of congressional attention. 
3. For the influence of select characteristics on crises independently: 
Null hypothesis (H0): Characteristics, such as intensity, timing, and cause, 
measurably influence the emergence of congressional attention post-crisis 
when occurring independently. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Characteristics, such as intensity, timing, and cause, do 
not measurably influence the emergence of congressional attention post-
crisis when occurring independently. 
4. For the influence of characteristics on various categories of crises: 
Null hypothesis (H0): Specific characteristics, such as intensity, gestation, 
resources, size, and fault, when combined do not result in a statistically 
significant difference in emergence of attention during crises, such as 
black swans and complex social crises, compared to crises such as wicked 
problems. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Specific characteristics, such as intensity, gestation, 
resources, size, and fault, when combined result in a statistically 
significant difference in emergence of attention during crises, such as 
black swans and complex social crises, compared to crises such as wicked 
problems. 
5. For the influence of economic impacts and fatalities on congressional 
attention: 
Null hypothesis (H0): Specific characteristic subsets of intensity, such as 
number of fatalities and economic impacts, cannot be correlated to an 
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increase in the number of congressional hearings after major natural 
disasters. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Specific characteristic subsets of intensity, such as 
number of fatalities and economic impacts, influence the number of 
congressional hearings after major natural disasters. 
This thesis, using the characteristics proposed by Gerston, Rochefort, and others, 
examined the degree of influence of characteristics on congressional attention and post-
crisis issue emergence.15 In addition, this thesis considered the application of theories on 
the episodic nature of attention and looked at both issue congruence and issue attention 
and their role in the emerging crisis, as it contributed to the primary hypotheses of this 
thesis.  
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Emerging problems often surprise lawmakers and agency officials and result in 
rapid, reactive governance. When galvanized by widespread concern and common 
purpose, stakeholders will hasten policy. This was the case in the creation of a homeland 
security organization after September 11, 2001.16 In other cases, emerging problems only 
garner a scant amount of attention and may or may not result in any political 
consideration. The political attention an issue does receive may or may not be sufficient 
to resolve the emergent problem and in many cases may be an over reactive auto-
response dictated by public opinion and issue salience.17  
The issue of the unpredictability of emergent problems is difficult because 
emerging crises are random as is public opinion and the public mood that reacts to them. 
The public’s emotional attachment to an issue may or may not be strong enough to 
warrant an issue rising to the public agenda. In some cases, the public’s sentiment to an 
issue is strong enough to prematurely displace other significant social and political issues 
                                                 
15 Gerston, Public Policy Making, 30; Rochefort and Cobb, The Politics of Problem Definition, 20;  
16 May, Joachim and Sapotichne, “Policy Regime and Governance,” 31. 
17 Ibid., 32. 
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(e.g., displacement of terrorism by Hurricane Katrina, economy, and corporate 
scandals).18  
This thesis contributes to the broader body of knowledge of crisis management by 
defining the primary theories that immediately influence emerging problems and crises, 
and it demonstrates the interrelated influences of the crisis environment on the overall 
power-potential of a developing crisis. Lastly, this thesis identifies a relevant and rich 
theoretical lens through which to examine theories of issue-attention, shedding light on 
how, when, and why Congress makes policy decisions on emerging events. The work of 
this thesis successfully quantifies the six most influential factors that impact 
congressional policy—whether that policy be reactive or over reactive.  
D. RESEARCH METHOD 
As noted in the initial hypotheses, if the broader purpose of the thesis is to map 
the connection between crisis and opportunity, then the primary objective is to 
demonstrate the importance of specific characteristics in emerging crises, such as an 
event’s size and impact, and how these characteristics influence the public and polity’s 
prioritization of problems. This thesis incorporates some elements of the grounded theory 
method, employing the data collection and coding methodologies and the interplay 
between data collection and theoretical analysis to aid in either proving or disproving this 
thesis. 
The following model was developed specifically for evaluating issue-emergence. 
Model One relates the total value of crisis to number of congressional hearings 
and can be expressed as:  
T = m * A, where m = f (scope, intensity, time, resources, fault, cause),  
and A = (Vf - Vi) / time; where Vf = n of hearings at initial emergence, and Vf = 
n of hearings at height  
                                                 
18 Donald F. Kettl, System under Stress: The Challenge to 21st Century Governance, 3rd ed. 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage/CQ Press, 2013), 159. 
 8 
1. Object / Sample  
The empirical analysis of this thesis examines recent crises and their emergence, 
examining the degree of attention and the rapidity of attention emergence, the average 
number of congressional hearings for each crisis, and the combined value of six 
predetermined characteristics: scope, intensity, timing, resources, cause, and fault. 
2. Sample Selection  
The first step in researching the power of emerging crises as catalysts is to define 
what a crisis is and what it is not. Determining what constitutes a crisis or catastrophe 
versus a more normalized event aids in determining the scope of the research collection 
and what will be included in the analysis. For instance, the frequency of the problem is 
extremely relevant to whether the issue is considered a crisis or catastrophe as the more 
frequently the problem is experienced, the less urgent it becomes. A variety of crises 
fitting the definition were selected for this thesis. All 25 selected crises varied by size, 
intensity, duration, frequency, and cause. 
3. Limits of the Study  
This study did not endeavor to determine why specific characteristics affect the 
public’s reaction to emerging crisis, such as the theory of bounded rationality and social 
identity theory. The psychology of crisis is a complex topic outside of the scope of this 
thesis. Concepts such as risk aversion and optimism bias were not discussed in this thesis, 
or if they are introduced, they were covered in a superficial manner, introduced as broad 
concepts. This study also did not examine the media’s role in the phenomenon of public 
attention. Determining salience of an issue by establishing media attention is a thesis all 
its own and is certainly deserving of additional research. Because there are many crises of 
varying types used in this study, there was not an individual case study conducted for 
each type. This thesis examined specifically six characteristics posited by Gerston, 
Rochefort, and others; this does not to imply a complete list, nor that these comprise the 
only characteristics that might influence emergent attention. The above mentioned are all 
areas where further research would bring a great deal of value to the understanding of 
crisis emergence, strategic communications, and complexity theory.  
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4. Data Sources  
The data used in this study was aggregated primarily from the University of Texas 
Austin and the Library of Congress. Codebooks and datasets reflecting congressional 
hearings, New York Times publications, public opinion polling, among others, were all 
used to support the positions of this thesis.19 Data on congressional hearings from 2010 to 
the present were collated from Congress.gov. The National Archives was used to validate 
previous data or for any data required prior to 1945.20  
In addition, public opinion data collected on current crises was aggregated from 
public opinion polling using several sources, such as Rasmussen, Pew, and Gallup, to 
examine the public’s view of “most important issues” affecting Americans. To examine 
the issue-attention cycle and its influence, data was compiled from Gallup, Rasmussen, 
and Pew Research Center reports on domestic homeland security and the perceived 
threats posed by future terrorist attacks dating from 2001 to present. Each of the surveys 
employed in this research included over 1,000 survey respondents, sampled randomly 
from voter-aged U.S. citizens. The average accuracy for the surveys included is 95 
percent with an average 3.5 percent (plus or minus) margin of error.21 The remaining 
references used for this study consisted of current news media articles on emerging crises 
and literature from a variety of disciplines in public policy presenting a variance of 
theories apropos to the topic of emerging crises and episodic attention.  
5. Type and Mode of Analysis  
This thesis research employed a three-phased approach to data collection and 
analysis: open, axial, and selective coding. These are described below.  
a. Selection of Problems 
The first step of this research was to select a group of crises for the study and the 
characteristics defining the issue post-event. In the following phases, research compiled 
                                                 
19 May, Joachim and Sapotichne, “Policy Regime and Governance,” 13.  
20 The National Archives can be found at http://www.archives.gov/congress/hearings.html. 
21 Margin of error refers to the variance in survey result data. For example, if a survey notes 45 
percent of respondents, 3.5 percent margin indicates a range from 41.5 percent to 48.5 percent. 
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raw data on congressional hearings and records. In addition to calculating crisis-
emergence, data was evaluated to determine if there was any variance between crises.  
b. Gathering Data 
Data was aggregated from a variety of sources by searching each “set” of raw 
data, whether on immigration, terrorism, or global warming, and looking for each 
mention of key subject terms. Each data set had approximately 600–1,000 hearings and 
records from 1946 to 2012. Over 10,800 hearings were examined for this thesis. 
c. Coding 
Coding is typically done in three stages. In open coding, data was labeled and 
categorized into “piles” of common data. Common characteristics were assigned to the 
sample of crises and qualitative values applied to each characteristic. Drs. Gerston, 
Rochefort, and Cobb’s characteristics of triggering events (introduced in the literature 
review) were assigned to the sampling of crises. The characteristics’ definitions were 
redefined to be more specific, enabling that each crisis could later be segregated into 
common groupings using axial coding. Axial coding further differentiates open data into 
“coding paradigms.”22 In this method of coding, the researcher seeks out ideas on how 
data is inter-related. For this research, axial coding was accomplished by assigning a 
quantitative criterion for each qualitative value created during open coding. This action 
applied a corresponding numerical value to each qualitative value. A numerical scale of 
one through three was used to represent qualitative values. 
Selective coding further relates coded data to other sets of coded data in an effort 
to discover causal relationships and other patterns associated with the coded data. 
Congressional hearing data was collected for each crisis coded using the above methods. 
As noted previously, raw data was aggregated for each crisis in the open coding phase. 
During selective coding, keyword searches were conducted to determine the number of 
hearings and records produced on a particular issue at its emergence compared to at the 
height of the crisis. This was done by sorting data sets comprised of congressional 
                                                 
22 David Garson, Grounded Theory (Raleigh, NC: North Carolina State: Statistical Assoc. Publishing, 
2013), 9.   
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hearings by the frequency of hearing topics throughout the life cycle of the given crisis. 
Calculations differentiated crises by the degree of congressional attention received over 
time. Congressional hearings and records were summed, averaged, and the crisis’ rate of 
emergence calculated as part of the selective coding method.  
d. Validating Hypotheses  
After the selective coding stage and some basic hypotheses were established, field 
testing was required to test the generated hypotheses. Whether tested in “real-time” or via 
hypothetical vehicles, the results either validated or invalidated the relationships inferred 
in the hypotheses. Validation was conducted by evaluating and comparing data as 
described below. 
e. Evaluation 
Once a complete dataset was populated for this study, data analysis looked at each 
crises’ emergence and decline separately, as a larger grouping, and lastly comparing one 
issue against another.  
f. Comparisons 
Last, issues of similar type and kind (e.g., natural disasters, viral epidemics, long-
term problems) were examined comparatively to determine how changes in the emerging 
issues’ characteristics affect their potential power to influence attention and change. 
Described in full below, determining the potential influence of an emerging crisis was 
achieved by applying the event’s value to basic principles of physics, namely those used 
to calculate acceleration and force where force is calculated as the sum of an object’s 
mass times its acceleration. In this study, acceleration is the initial momentum (the 
number of hearings at emergence) subtracted from the highest momentum divided by the 
duration of emergence from one to the other.  
g. Conclusions 
Any conclusions were drawn at this stage. Each crisis was examined against the 
data from other crises to determine whether specific variables (or combinations of 
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variables) or those crises exceeding a certain weighted value tended to emerge faster or 
stay relevant longer than others that were not weighted as high.  
All data supporting this thesis and employed to defend hypotheses stated herein 
were analyzed using the analytics programs MATLAB® and SPSS® to identify trends and 
patterns related to emergence and to validate statistical significance of relationships 
between seemingly unrelated data. As a matter of good scientific practice, all statistical 
analysis for this study used a confidence level of α = 0.05. A significance value of less 
than P = 0.05 represents a statistically significant relationship when conducting 
multivariate and univariate data analysis. P = 0.01 represents a highly significant 
statistical relationship.23 The P-value, Wilks’s lambda, and the F-ratio value were the 
primary means by which statistical significance was demonstrated in this thesis.  
6. Outcome  
This thesis has established a repeatable model whereby an emerging crisis can be 
evaluated by its characteristics to predict the likely reaction of government. This thesis 
demonstrates quantitative methods to help simplify the complexity posed by future crises 
through estimation of the value of crises and their potential outcomes. The ability to 
evaluate emerging crises based on their value enables researchers to postulate risk of 
possible outcomes in an effort to avoid reactive, sporadic governance. By having a more 
acute sense of the reaction of governance of particular emerging crises, one can better 
socialize potential crises and the reactive outcomes. Recognition of the potential for 
reactiveness in governance may be the most important step to creating a culture of 
controlled proactive agenda setting. The merit of this research transcends the 
organizational or political future of a single entity or specific stakeholder. Ideally, this 
work will provide an alternate method to observe and study the dynamics of emerging 
crises and episodic attention, providing an opportunity to analyze, comprehend, and then 
react differently. 
 
                                                 
23 A value of P = 0.01 represents a chance of less than 1 in 100 the relationship between variables is 
uncorrelated; therefore a 99 percent probability exists of influence.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Are things really that bad? I am skeptical concerning all highly alarmist 
views because so many previous prophets of doom and disasters have 
been so wrong concerning so many so-called ‘crises’ in our society.  
Anthony Downs24 
 
The following literature review provides a brief summary of contemporary 
thinkers in public policy and endeavors to combine common hypotheses and theories 
relevant to this thesis. Existing research, summarized in the following, suggests there are 
several features that correspond to the emergence of public agenda and policy in post-
crisis events. The key features of policy development discussed in this literature review 
include the triggering event, the emergence of the issue-attention cycle, subsequent 
emergence of what is termed the policy window, and contributors to the fore mentioned 
theories.  
A. DEFINING CRISIS 
The term crisis, aptly described as the dominant motif of the “rhetoric of 
calamity” is surely one of the most ambiguous and simultaneously ubiquitous terms in 
public policy circles.25 A search for the term “crisis” results in nearly 57 million 
responses in just less than .35 seconds, depending on the day. An Internet word-cloud 
search shows everything from the Ebola crisis to the banking and healthcare “crisis.”26 
From the Greek word kríno, meaning to judge, assess, or decide, the word crisis as 
defined by Oxford means “a time of intense difficulty, trouble, or danger.”27 Rochefort 
and Cobb of Northwestern and Brown universities respectively describe the term as 
denoting a circumstance of dire nature where corrective action is long overdue. In their 
work, Problem Definition: An Emerging Perspective, they note the thin veil separating a 
                                                 
24 Anthony Downs, “Up and Down with Ecology: The ‘Issue-Attention Cycle,’” Public Interest 28 
(summer 1972): 55, http://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/teaching/articles/Downs_Public_Interest_1972.pdf.  
25 Rochefort and Cobb, The Politics of Problem Definition, 20. 
26 The search was performed using the word-cloud search site Clusty.com, searching the word “crisis.” 
27 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. s.v. “crisis,” accessed July 2, 2015, http://www.oed.com/.  
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problem from a crisis and observe it is a matter of mere viewpoint and often semantics.28 
Yet, most scholars tend to agree the crisis has three primary characteristics: threat, 
uncertainty, and urgency.29 
“危机,” Chinese for crisis (pronounced wēijī) is a compound word comprised of 
danger (wei) and opportunity (ji). However, the symbol is often misrepresented in the 
English pop culture as crisis and opportunity.30 Rather, the correct interpretation is a 
“critical point,” referring to a specific opportunistic moment- a sort of tipping point- 
resulting from a precarious event.31 This is similar to the Greek interpretation of krino 
above.  
Dr. Thomas Birkland, University of Albany SUNY, proposes a clear delineation 
between the terms crisis, disaster, and catastrophe.32 Adapting from the tourism 
industry, Birkland notes a crisis as an organizationally caused event (e.g., Exxon Valdez), 
a disaster as an event beyond organizational influence or control (e.g., September 11, 
2001), and catastrophes, which are disasters on a macro-scale that render governments 
unable to respond (e.g., Katrina, Southeast Asia Tsunami, 2011 Japanese Tsunami).33  
Theoretical physicist Dr. Per Bak and Dr. Charles Perrow introduce theories on 
probability and normal accidents.34 Normal accidents are defined as “events that are 
                                                 
28 Rochefort and Cobb, The Politics of Problem Definition, 21.  
29 Boin, The Politics of Crisis Management, 1–3; Georgio Boustras and Nikolaos Boukas, “Tourism 
and SME Sectors,” Proceedings of the 1st International Conference in Safety and Crisis Management in 
the Construction, ed. Georgio Boustras and Nikolaos Boukas (641–657), 2011, 
http://www.bookpump.com/bwp/pdf-b/2335578b.pdf, 641.  
30 Victor H. Mair, “Danger + Opportunity ≠ Crisis: How a Misunderstanding about Chinese 
Characters has Led Many Astray,” September 2009, http://www.pinyin.info/chinese/crisis.html   
31 Ibid. 
32 Ronald W. Perry and Enrico L. Quarantelli, What is a Disaster?: New Answers to Old Questions 
(Philadelphia: Xlibris, 2005), 46; Thomas A. Birkland, Lessons of Disaster Policy Change after 
Catastrophic Events (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006), 2. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic Books, 
1984); Per Bak and Stefan Boettcher, “Self-Organized Criticality and Punctuated Equilibria,” Physica D 
107 (1997): 143–150, http://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/9701157.  
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unexpected, unintentional, and likely result in damage or injury.”35 Dr. Nassim Taleb, 
another contemporary thinker on crisis complexity, proposed the notion of black swans, 
defined by Oxford as “unpredictable or unforeseen event, typically one with extreme 
consequences.”36 Although Taleb’s definition fits some emerging crises, it is arguable 
not all fit into this category. The incident impacts a single part of the system whereas the 
accident is the failure of the entire system.37 As a result of increased and tighter 
couplings of interrelated networks, there are some who believe crises are moving beyond 
the “typical” or knowable to the chaotic environ of “terrae incognitae.”38  
The definition of black swan is similar to that of catastrophe, which is defined by 
Oxford as “an event causing great and sudden damage.”39 The word is derived from the 
Latin catastropha, meaning kata- “down” and strophē “turning.”40 The term catastrophe, 
seemingly added to the English lexicon circa 1755 by Samuel Johnson via the Dictionary 
of the English Language, can likely be attribute to the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, yet 
found its origin circa the fourth century AD with the playwright Donatus.41 The term 
catastrophe, of theatrical origins, refers to the unraveling of events after building to 
epitasis.42 For this thesis, the definition of crisis will be as follows: “a serious threat to 
the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time 
pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions.”43 This 
definition represents the most complete rendering of the fore mentioned academic 
theories on crisis. 
                                                 
35 Perrow, Normal Accidents, 5. 
36 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “black swan.”  
37 Lewis, Sand Piles, 76.  
38 Patrick Lagadec, A New Cosmology of Risks and Crises Time for a Radical Shift in Paradigm and 
Practice (Route de Saclay, France: cahier de recherché, 2008), 5.   
39 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “catastrophe.” 
40 Lagadec, A New Cosmology of Risks and Crises, 5.  
41 Jörg Trempler, “Catastrophes and Their Images: Event and Pictorial Act,” Res: Anthropology and 
Aesthetics (spring/autumn 2013): 201.    
42 Michael J. Sidnell, ed., Sources of Dramatic Theory (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 79–81. Attributed to a fragment from Donatus, On Comedy and Tragedy, c. 4th century AD.  
43 Boin, The Politics of Crisis Management, 2. 
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B. SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ON POLICY EMERGENCE 
It is important to acknowledge what others have said about issue emergence and 
political science. There are varying schools of thought in political science and the public 
policy process. Some see the discipline as a hard science where standard rules and 
scientific rigor apply and results are often predictable and repeatable (as in mathematics 
and physics). One of the more often referred to contemporaries of the discipline, Dr. Paul 
Sabatier suggests there are clear stages of the public policy process, that the process 
works within a given framework, and that the cycle of growth and contraction of 
government is dynamic, yet somewhat predictable.44 Sabatier, like others, agrees to the 
understood course of the recognized political process. What is unsettled are the 
influences to the political agenda—what drives an issue from initial emergence into the 
political arena and are the variables static, or are they as other would suggest, more 
dynamic and less predictable?  
In nearly all cases, authorities on the subject agree the discipline of public policy 
is not entirely a predictive science. Some, like Dr. John Kingdon, theorize the political 
process is not entirely random but is a predictive process to a point.45 Kingdon suggests 
the public policy process consists of structured couplings and general constraints that 
correspond to make the process somewhat repeatable. Others see the discipline not as a 
hard science, but as a science continuously changing and more opaque. For example, Dr. 
Gabriel Almond compares the science of public policy metaphorically using clocks and 
clouds. He suggests that all things fit along a continuum spanning from entirely random 
and unpredictable events to entirely ordered and controlled events (clouds being 
representative of randomness and the clock of ordered processes). In presenting his 
position, Almond makes several observations, noting using mathematics to develop 
predictive models in public policy may be a flawed effort. He maintains that although 
some manner of political process can be predicted, the emergence of politics is based on 
                                                 
44 Paul Sabatier, Theories of the Policy Process (Davis, CA: Westview Press, 2007), 5. 
45 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 206. 
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“accidental conjunctions by events that have a low probability of occurring.”46 Almond’s 
position is supported by Dr. Larry Gerston, who suggests that public policy is not an 
ordered process akin to hard sciences, but it is instead based on unpredictable variables 
and attitudes of the general public that may coincidentally overlap with improbable 
events.47  
Politically and logically, the debate over colloquial terms such as “hard” and 
“soft” science matters little. Political science is a science of the democratic process, for 
which empirical data is derived from human behavior and decision making, and therefore 
rests somewhere in the middle with elements of both. The analysis of historical data to 
develop predictive models is the work of economists and tends toward hard sciences with 
scientifically repeatable methods.48 The study of social and normative behavior akin to 
public decision, opinion, and decision making is the work of sociologists and 
psychologists and closer to soft science. The research conducted for this project used data 
(both historical and data extrapolated from more recent case studies) to investigate 
whether specific variables and indicators, when combined, could predict issue-attention 
and policy cycle emergence. Accordingly, this thesis demonstrates that the policy cycle 
emergence can be modeled as a statistical phenomenon that obeys a probability 
distribution. Furthermore, issue-attention is significantly correlated with measurable 
characteristics (scope, intensity, timing, resources, cause, and culpability).  
One of the foremost premises for public adoption of issues or public adaptive 
issue-emergence is the application of social identity theory in the formation of public 
opinion. There is no debate as to whether public opinion affects emerging policy—one 
commonly begets the other; however, there are some cases, such as the economic crisis in 
1890, where public and even popular party opinion were ineffective in changing the 
economic strategy of the day. The immediate decisions of the presidency had the 
                                                 
46 Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen Genco, “Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics,” World Politics 
29, no. 4 (1977): 497.  
47 Gerston, Public Policy Making, 8. 
48 It should be noted there is some debate as to the accuracy of economists and their general agreement 
among their community. Noah Smith, “Should We Trust Economists?” The Atlantic, June 4, 2013, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/06/should-we-trust-economists/276497/  
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potential to either “sustain Americanism or… plant Socialism.”49 According to Higgs, 
“Governments even in a representative democracy, may seize more power than the 
majority of citizens wishes to grant them, but they may also refuse or exercise powers 
that many citizens would thrust upon them.”50 More modern examples germane to the 
issue of U.S. domestic security are evident in the implementation of the PATRIOT Act 
and the Transportation Security Administration.51 The question is what defines the 
magnitude of an emerging issue or problem. Social identity theory applied to this 
question suggests social dynamics accentuated by race, economic status, or other social 
identifiers (e.g., urban versus suburban, regionalism) contribute to the definition of issue 
emergence.52 This social dynamic has been postulated as an alternative underpinning to 
modern democratic theory.53 Furthermore, social identity theory, as presented by Cobb 
and Elder, may help explain why some issues, such as civil rights, immigration, and 
others, remain on the public agenda and capture the public’s attention longer than others. 
C. ISSUE-ATTENTION CYCLE 
The concept of issue-attention was developed by economist Anthony Downs in 
the 1970s to describe the rise and fall of public attention to issues deemed important. 
Downs theorized an issue would emerge from a pre-state, grow in prominence as a social 
issue until such time the public became discouraged by the “costs” of change.54 After the 
realization of costs, the issue would slowly decline in importance and return to a post-
problem state. A very clear example of this can be seen in the Interstate-35W bridge 
collapse in Minneapolis. The issue of transportation infrastructure became a regional 
issue very quickly and resulted in near immediate action on the part of regional 
                                                 
49 Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 78–79.   
50 Ibid. 
51 Joel Griffin, “TSA Fights Losing Battle in Court of Public Opinion,” Security Info Watch, June 14, 
2013, http://www.securityinfowatch.com/blog/10961654/tsa-constantly-finds-itself-in-catch-22-situations.  
52 W. Lance Bennett, Public Opinion in American Politics (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1980), 236–237.   
53 Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, “The Politics of Agenda Building: An Alternative Perspective for 
Modern Democratic Theory,” The Journal of Politics 33, no. 4 (1971): 822.  
54 Downs, “Up and Down with Ecology: The ‘Issue-Attention Cycle,’” 50.  
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politicians. However, the same cannot be said nationally, although it was observed by the 
National Transportation Safety Board that there was a need. The cost of correcting the 
issue nationally, which measured in the trillions, likely contributed to the issue’s decline 
in issue-attention, according to Downs’s model.55  
The concept of issue-attention is valid, can be clearly seen in post-crisis 
environments, and is a generally accepted academic theory. Issue-attention is a 
recognized dynamic in the development of public opinion and is referred to in a variety 
of references, including a variety of academic journals and studies on issue-attention. 
Typically, when issue-attention is discussed, it is done so in the forum of media influence 
on public opinion.  
There is a strong connection to Downs’s issue-attention cycle applied to the 
aftermath of urban riots in 1960 made by Drs. David Olson and Michael Lipsky. Their 
work suggests after considering myriad plausible reasons for the issue disappearing from 
political agenda, issue-attention may have been the cause.56 Dr. Lance Bennett of Yale 
explains, “When an issue moves toward resolution or has reached its climax, issues can 
be bumped by other emergent issues.”57 As noted earlier, Bennett and Barber suggest 
there are strong social identity under-currents that influence public opinion and issue-
attention in certain emerging problems. Specifically, Bennett argues that the 1960 riots 
became increasingly tenuous by the disparity in race and social status.58 Elder suggests 
race and social class may be the very issue that prevented issue-emergence on the public 
agenda.59 In more recent occurrences, Bennett’s use of the 1960s riots may be applicable 
to the Ferguson and Baltimore riots in 2014 and 2015. According to Bennet et al., these 
initiating events are what trigger issue-attention. There is among social scientists the 
                                                 
55 Claude Haberman, “A Disaster Brought Awareness but Little Action on Infrastructure,” New York 
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56 Michael Lipsky and David J. Olson, “The Processing of Racial Crisis in America,” Politics in 
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58 Ibid., 243. 
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belief that the triggering event also initiates the emergence of the policy process and 
establishment of a salient issue on the public and possibly the political agenda.  
D. TRIGGERING EVENTS  
Gerston, in his work Public Policy Making: Process and Principles, suggests 
accuracy and predictability do not exist in public policy.60 According to Gerston, 
persistent characteristics of emergent issues likely to result in the policy cycle include 
those that cause attention (salient issues), actors on those issues (political actors and the 
public), resources affected by the issue (social dynamics, economic, etc.), institutions that 
engage (special interest groups), and the level of government that addresses the issue.  
Gerston also remarks on the concept of pre-conditions, as cited in Dr. John 
Kingdon’s work.61 As presented by Gerston, and Kingdon, preconditions evolve due to 
“triggering mechanisms” or emerging crises.62 A precondition may be a social dynamic 
(e.g., minority demographic) or an engineering precondition (e.g., the New Orleans levee 
conditions prior to Hurricane Katrina). This is an important point because it substantially 
builds or dovetails in other contemporary works. Gerston explains, “Triggering 
mechanisms are important in reordering the consciousness levels of both the public and 
the public policy makers.”63 The term “triggering mechanism” or “focusing events” 
refers to the initiating incident or crisis that transforms a problem from its latent pre-
condition state to a recognizable emergent state.  
Dr. Thomas Birkland suggests the ebb and flow of political agenda development 
is based on events that emerge to the public’s attention, either slowly or quickly. He also 
notes that the issues that develop more rapidly have a stronger impact on policy 
development and can be better influenced by social demands. Birkland offers events, 
such as Pearl Harbor, September 11, 2001 and the Exxon Valdez disaster, that were all 
focusing events—rapid catalysts for latent preconditions to grow as emergent issues. 
                                                 
60 Gerston, Public Policy Making, 8. 
61 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 23. 
62 Ibid., 94. 
63 Gerston, Public Policy Making, 23. 
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What Birkland terms focusing events are different than Gerston’s triggering mechanisms, 
although one concept can be seen as a contributor to the other.64 
In his work System under Stress, Dr. Thomas Kettl refers to focusing events as 
“policy lightning” (simply a repackaged name for the same concept).65 By drawing an 
interesting correlation from paleontologist Stephen Gould’s work, Kettle theorizes that 
the development of politics is achieved through a combination of punctuated equilibrium 
and incrementalism as presented by Charles Lindblom.66 This combination of emerging 
patterns implies the emergence of attention in some cases occurs rapidly, whereas it 
occurs more slowly in others. Dr. Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones reject the idea of 
incrementalism as described by Lindblom, noting that change, rather than incremental, is 
more rapid and pronounced.67 A compelling case is made for the concept of punctuated 
equilibrium by Dr. Robert Higgs in his seminal work Crisis and Leviathan: Critical 
Episodes in the Growth of Government.68 Most prominent authors on the subject agree, 
however, it is in this emergent state that issues become prime for development. 
Punctuated equilibrium does correlate to Anthony Downs’s issue-attention cycle, and the 
potential to develop valuation of focusing events to determine likelihood of political 
development.69 
E. THE VALUE OF FOCUSING EVENTS  
Gerston offers four variables that influence the value or significance of a focusing 
event. These include: 
Scope—How large is the triggering event? 
Intensity—Represented by the violence of emergence. 
                                                 
64 Thomas A. Birkland, Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events (Washington DC: 
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Time—How long did the issue take to emerge? 
Resources—How significant is the resource impacts (financial / people / tools).70  
According to Gerston’s research of the above variables, not all are weighted 
equally. It appears that the more intense the event (i.e., the more rapidly it escalates), the 
more effective it is as a focusing event and more likely it will be to result in an 
emergence of the issue-attention cycle.71 Drs. David Rochefort and Roger Cobb further 
Gerston’s work on characteristics of emerging problems, suggesting the most prominent 
aspect of problem definition stems from the question of culpability and blame. Their 
work The Politics of Problem Definition suggests crises resulting from organizational 
failure or failure of complex networks rather than the idiosyncratic nature of human error 
are more likely to result in legislative action for tighter regulation.72 This is further 
supported by Dr. Deborah Stone of Dartmouth College, who offers a slightly more 
exacting view of the issue:  
In politics, we look for causes not only to understand how the world works 
but to assign responsibility for problems. Once we think we know the 
cause of the problem, we use that knowledge to prevent people from 
causing the problem.73 
Bennett and others suggest there are additional contributors to the value of a 
focusing event, including media influence and special interest group support.74 These 
additional influences contribute to the demand for action and consequent development of 
the issue on the political agenda through what is termed the “policy window.”  
This thesis adds to the literature by demonstrating a statistically significant 
relationship between issue-attention and the characteristics posited by Gerston and others. 
Furthermore, this work proposes quantifiable measures of Gerston’s four characteristics 
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71 Ibid., 26.  
72 This is similar to the theory presented by Charles Perrow in the work Normal Accidents. Rochefort 
and Cobb, The Politics of Problem Definition, 13–15.  
73 Deborah A. Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making (New York: Norton, 
2002), 189.  
74 Bennett, Public Opinion in American Politics, 237.  
 23 
as well as those of Rochefort and Cobb. This makes it possible to correlate issue-attention 
emergence and intensity with crisis characteristics.  
F. POLICY WINDOWS 
At the height of the issue-attention cycle emerges what is termed by economist 
John Kingdon as the “policy window.”75 The policy window is the opportunity to 
implement policy post-crisis via the emergence of particular issues on the decision 
agenda. He offers that the policy window, although rare, is what drives major change in 
policy development.76 Kingdon presents the public policy process and proposes several 
frameworks for the development of policy agenda.  
According to Gerston, the policy window exists in some state before the 
triggering event.77 This is similar to Kingdon; however, Kingdon refers to the 
contributors to the policy window development as streams, the confluence of which 
triggers the window. However, Kingdon’s streams (the problem, the political state, and 
available policies) do not all enter the process at the same time.78  
As is suggested by Gerston, the problem exists in a latent state before the 
“triggering event.”79 Because the policy window is a confluence of Kingdon’s streams, 
available agendas, and political dynamics would not be known until after the event, it 
follows the policy window should not precede the triggering event as Gerston suggests. 
This point is important because it more accurately orders the sequence of issue-
emergence post crisis.  
G. POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
Bennett suggests the broad category of issues is what helps determine their fate in 
the public agenda. Bennett discusses issue formation, creating three broad categories of 
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political issues: structural issues, agenda issues, and crisis issues, and focuses on the 
development of the public opinion and its influence on agenda setting.80 As does Thomas 
Dye and others, Bennett offers that special interest groups and influential individuals are 
those outside the political circle with the greatest chance of influencing agenda. Dye’s 
public policy systems model suggests special interest support is an influential factor in 
the political agenda formation process.81  
There is a connection to the work of Gerston, Downs, and Kingston in Bennett’s 
general model of public opinion. Furthermore, when combined with Dye’s systems 
model of policy emergence, a new model can be derived. Bennett’s hypothesis on the 
process of public opinion helps derive the value of Gerston’s social impact model and 
substantially contributes to the validity of a new combined systems model.  
H. SUMMARY OF POLICY EMERGENCE THEORIES 
The five categories of theories presented above work in tandem with one another.  
1. The incremental or punctuated growth of government is dependent on the 
relevant issues established on the political agenda.  
2. Unexpected crises result in the emergence of the issue-attention cycle, 
whereby, although not in all cases, issues are brought to the attention of 
public officials and special interest groups. 
3. Unexpected crises resulting in issue-attention are termed “focusing 
events.” These events are what act as a catalyst to legislative attention, as 
is shown in this thesis.  
4. The degree and duration of attention an issue receives within the polity is 
termed the “policy window.” Another useful way to think of the policy 
window is a period of legislative opportunity.  
5. The above four theories are what culminate in policy development.  
In Figure 1, the model created from the aforementioned theories in Chapter II, 
illustrates several ideas. Using two progressive models side-by-side, Figure 1 attempts to 
illustrate the emergence of public opinion in-step with the emergence of the issue-
attention cycle and the policy window. An excellent case in which to view all of the 
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above may be in regards to the emergence of environmental policies within the United 
States.  
 
Figure 1.  Combined Public Policy Theories Sequence Model, Chronological 
On March 18, 1967, the Liberian-registered supertanker Torrey Canyon ran 
aground off of Land’s End and the Scilly Isles, United Kingdom. The 947-foot stricken 
ship, unable to be freed from the reef, discharged nearly 32 million gallons of oil, 
spreading along the shores of the south coast of England and the Normandy coast of 
France.82 In the United States, only a small minority of environmentally conscious 
citizens knew of this catastrophe. Environmental attention within the U.S. began to 
emerge gradually around this period, noted by the emergence of Secretary of the Interior 
Stewart Udall’s The Quiet Crisis, a heralding piece on environmental pollution with an 
                                                 
82 “1967: Supertanker Torrey Canyon Hits Rocks,” BBC Web, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/18/newsid_4242000/4242709.stm.  
 26 
introduction by President Kennedy, followed several years later by Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring, a pop-culture book on irreversible human impacts on the environment.  
Prior to 1969, interest in environmental issues, as noted in Figure 2 by the number 
of New York Times articles published on the subject was incremental, showing no sign of 
significant increase. Then on January 29, 1969, an offshore well blowout occurred six 
miles offshore of Santa Barbara, California. Over an 11-day period, approximately 
200,000 gallons of crude oil discharged from 3,500-feet beneath the ocean.83 The 
environmental disaster, when coupled with the Cuyahoga River fire the following year, 
became the “triggering event” for radical environmental policy change.  
 
Figure 2.  Environment as Most Important Problem in U.S. and New York 
Times Environment Articles from 1946–201284 
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Following the Santa Barbara spill, the local Santa Barbara Editor Thomas Storke 
remarked:  
Never in my long lifetime have I ever seen such an aroused populace at 
the grassroots level. This oil pollution has done something I have never 
seen before in Santa Barbara—it has united citizens of all political 
persuasions in a truly nonpartisan cause.85 
President Nixon later observed, “It is sad that it was necessary that Santa Barbara 
should be the example that had to bring it to the attention of the American people…The 
Santa Barbara incident has frankly touched the conscience of the American people.”86 
Evident in these remarks and with data in Figure 2 is the emergence of both issue-
attention as well as the policy window, arguably caused by Gerston’s factors of scope, 
intensity, timing, resources, cause, and fault. Similar reactions were seen in in both 
Deepwater Horizon and Exxon Valdez, discussed in Chapter V. The following year, as a 
second-order effect of issue punctuation, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration was created and National Earth Day drew over 20 million participants. By 
1972, the Clean Water Act is passed, amending the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act.87  
The example of environmental policy displays the emergence of legislative 
change and U.S. government growth resulting from a manmade crisis in Santa Barbara. 
The events in California, compounded by the supertanker Torrey Canyon and the 
Cuyahoga River events, underscore the characteristics posed in this thesis: that post-crisis 
factors, such as issue intensity, size, timing, resources, cause, and culpability play a large 
role in the emergence of congressional and public attention within the U.S. (see Table 1). 
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Table 1.   Contemporary Political Science Theories on Problem Emergence and Growth in Government 
Theory Author Description Occurrence 
Incrementalism Lindblom Slow, predictable growth in government.  Incrementalism represents periods of growth occurring in between periods of punctuation, as seen from 1960–1968 in Figure 2 and from 1974–1989.  
Social Identity Theory Rochefort and Cobb 
Social identity theory applied suggests social dynamics accentuated by race, economic status, or other social identifiers affect outcome of how political problems are framed. 
Typically seen in complex social issues such as immigration, civil rights, rioting, drug abuse, and AIDs. This theory would apply to environmental activists prior to 1968, such as Carson. 
Triggering Events Gerston Triggering events are the unexpected events (crises), which result in reactions in the public and in polity. 
The Santa Barbara well blowout acted as a triggering event. Arguably, the Torrey Canyon and Cuyahoga River fire also contributed to the passage of the Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1972. 
Issue-Attention Cycle Downs Issue-attention is a five-stage process of attention (public or political) emergence resulting from an unexpected initiating event. 
A clear illustration of issue-attention can be seen after September 11, 2001. See Chpt. IV. In the Santa Barbara example, this is clear through NYT articles in Figure 2 and Nixon’s remarks.  
Punctuated 
Equilibrium 
Originated with Stephen Gould; popularized in public policy by Baumgartner and Jones, and others. 
Punctuated equilibrium describes the accentuated episodic reaction in government to external influences. 
This theory applied can be seen in Figure 2 starting in 1972. After its episodic emergence in 1968, the issue of environment remains an important issue, transitioning to a new norm.  
Policy Window Kingdon 
The “policy window,” or political opportunity is the result of three features: the problem, the political state, and available policies. A problem will exist in a latent state before emerging to the polity’s attention after an unexpected event, where the problem may be addressed. 
An example of the policy window in application can be seen after the Santa Barbara spill in 1969. The Torrey Canyon spill of U.K. primed the political landscape for legislation after the Santa Barbara spill two years later in the form of the CWA.  
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III. PUNCTUATED CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT 
A. PUNCTUATED GROWTH 
Unanticipated events, such as the Santa Barbara well blowout in 1969 described 
in Chapter II, disrupt the balance of governance and force change. Gradual growth in 
government, accentuated by periods of unanticipated rapid expansion is a generally 
accepted phenomenon in the study of the political sciences, earning the term ratcheting or 
as biologist Dr. Gould of Harvard terms, punctuated equilibria. Dr. Bryan Jones and Dr. 
Frank Baumgartner via their punctuated equilibrium theory popularized the latter in the 
social sciences. Dr. Robert Higgs, a senior fellow of the Independent Institute observed, 
“After each major crisis the size of government, though smaller than during the crisis, 
remained larger than it would have been had the pre-crisis rate of growth persisted during 
the interval occupied by the crisis.”93 An example of punctuated growth of government 
caused by the emergence of unanticipated crises (focusing events) is depicted in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Government Spending Increase for Goods and Services as 
Percentage of GDP94 
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The incremental and punctuated expansion of government is visualized in Figure 
3, which depicts the gross domestic product (GDP) from 1900 to 1984, covering periods 
of significant national activity including the Great Depression and two world wars. The 
GDP was used as it is generally accepted as one of the best indicators of the growth of 
government.95 The sharp increases in GDP relate to significant episodic events or crises, 
which initiated incremental change (growth) in government. The first sharp increase in 
Figure 3 is World War I, resulting in an increase from a mean (average) of six percent to 
21 percent of GDP. After the war, the GDP fell to a slightly higher than pre-war level. 
After the stock market crash on October 27, 1929, the GDP rose again over the following 
years, doubling in size from seven percent to a mean of 14 percent.96 It remained at that 
level throughout the New Deal period (1932 to 1940). From 1929 to 1933, when 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt took office, unemployment had increased by nearly 
seven million to 15 million and the gross domestic product had decreased from $103.8 
billion to $55.7 billion.97 This accounts for the perceived increase in GDP over this 
period. The next largest periods of growth are in 1940 and 1952, resulting from World 
War II and the Korean War.  
The effects of crisis have a similar impact on the growth of government because 
post-crisis society often differs significantly from the pre-crisis state. Crises are dubbed 
historically critical events because they directly impact the course of historical events.98 
The remainder of this chapter briefly examines unexpected crises, which resulted in 
punctuated change in government. These include issues of commerce as well as issues of 
natural disasters. Natural disasters were examined because it is these types of regular, yet 
unanticipated events that continue to surprise us. Understanding when and how 
unanticipated issues emerge to affect legislation, and how long issues stay relevant goes a 
long way to providing a more accurate picture of the issue-attention cycle and policy 
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window. In turn, this enables considerations of potential policy development and political 
opportunity in the future.  
B. INTERSTATE COMMERCE, ANTITRUST, AND OTHER MAJOR 
CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT 
When we consider that the theory of our institutions guarantees to every 
citizen the full enjoyment of all the fruits of his industry and enterprise, 
with only such deduction as may be his share toward the careful and 
economical maintenance of the Government which protects him, it is plain 
that the exaction of more than this is indefensible extortion and a culpable 
betrayal of American fairness and justice.  
Grover Cleveland99 
The period of the late 1800s represented significant change in the economic and 
commerce structure of the U.S. This is demonstrated by several landmark federal statutes, 
enhancing the regulation of commerce and establishing protection against monopolies. 
The first, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, followed the completion of the 
transcontinental railroad, which increased U.S.-transported freight from 2.16 billion tons 
per mile in 1865 to 7.48 billion in 1873.100 By 1881, the rail freight industry had 
increased by 113 percent to $16 billion.101 The agricultural industry, at risk of being 
unfairly taken advantage of by the rail industry, began to question the absolute control 
railroads exercised over many parts of the country. During this period, rail was essential 
to moving agricultural goods to other parts of the country; therefore, it was incumbent 
farmers use rail transport. The opportunity to exploit a capitalistic vantage point created 
by this dynamic made rail industry susceptible to extortion and unfair business practices. 
However, the post-Civil War presidents and many in Congress generally eschewed 
intervention in commerce and economic matters, leaving issues of commerce to the 
citizens.102 
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Under pressure from the agricultural community and the growing number of 
Populist supporters, the Interstate Commerce Act was passed in 1887, which created the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, and required a standard rate be established across the 
rail transport industry. Although revolutionary for its time, the law was cited as, “A 
delusion and a sham,” which is how Senator Nelson W. Aldrich described it.103 
Enforcement of the act was insignificant at best and nonexistent at worst. 
Notwithstanding, this piece of legislation was one of the first significant contemporary 
economic legislations in U.S. history, and the first to establish standards of fair business 
practices in U.S. commerce.  
Shortly after the Commerce Act, Congress passed the first antitrust law, the 
Sherman Act, in 1890. Described as a “comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed 
at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade,” the act was enacted to 
extricate the presence of emerging monopolies.104 Citizens, including western farmers, 
were used to work with smaller entities during business negotiations.  
The establishment of large trusts, two or three major companies that controlled 
nearly all wealth and movement of goods, was contrary to the post-Civil War way of life. 
Higgs notes, “American public opinion and legal tradition had long been hostile toward 
monopolies.”105 As the majority work force at the time, western farmers contributed to 
the narrative against large manufacturing and railroad conglomerates.106 Two landmark 
antitrust laws were passed in 1914: the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton 
Act. The acts were described as an insincere concession to public opinion, ultimately 
placing more burdens on the labor union than on the monopolies the acts were designed 
to regulate. The rapid increase in economic regulation by the federal government 
arguably increased the American sentiment toward Populism in the late 1890s. 
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C. NATURAL DISASTERS AND MAJOR CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT 
The establishment of the Federal Trade Commission and Commerce Act 
represented, at the time, some of the more significant legislation to date, followed closely 
by several periods of tumult, including depression and war. Although it is easy to identify 
the incremental and punctuated growth of government resulting from triggering events by 
looking at economics, the same can be done when examining crises.  
Since the 1950 Disaster Relief Act, there have been 12 significant legislative 
advancements in disaster response and mitigation, approximately one every five years 
(see Table 2). This study begins in 1950 because prior to then, emergency aid was 
provided by local or state entities; there was no federal aid for response, recovery, or 
mitigation. Since 1950, there have been 563 congressional hearings on natural disasters 
and similar catastrophes, an average of approximately 10 per year. The number of 
hearings annually pales to the numbers of total natural disasters, large and small, which 
occur nationwide annually. However, since 1950, there have only been 20 natural 
disasters arguably considered major, most of which resulted in legislative action of some 
form. As noted in the hypothesis of this thesis, the attention a crisis garners changes 
depending on specific dynamics of the crisis (e.g., scope, intensity, timing, resources, and 
cause). There are also factors that affect major natural disasters in particular (e.g., the 
amount of damage, economic impact, and number of fatalities). Table 2 illustrates the 
major natural disaster and the subsequent legislative action taken as a result of the 
disaster. All congressional hearings on natural disasters were compiled from 1945 to 
2010. Each period of heightened attention appears to last around three years before 
declining. Periods of significant punctuation (e.g., after Hurricane Katrina) are typically 
followed by approximately a five-year period of declination before normalizing.  
The cases presented above, coupled with the examples of punctuated growth via 
natural disasters validates the theory of punctuated equilibrium as posited by 
Baumgartner and Jones and supports the theory of Lindblom on incrementalism. Periods 
of stasis in congressional attention offset by heightened emergence and subsequent 
legislation express a repeating pattern of attention across multiple unrelated areas of 
policy making. The theories presented in this chapter, particularly the issue of punctuated 
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change, are important in understanding the ebb and flow of congressional attention and 




Table 2.   Legislative Development in Natural Disasters, 1945–2010 
Year Event Description Legislation Outcome 
1951 1951 Great Floods ≈$935,000,000 (1951), ≈$8.4B (2014).≈500,000 displaced. 
Federal Flood Insurance Act, PL 
84–1016 
Although introduced, program was never started 
because House denied funding.  
1964 1964 Good Friday Earthquake 9.2 earthquake, 139 dead, ≈$311M in damage ($2.28B, 2014) Disaster Relief Act of 1966, PL-
89-769 
Amended 1950 Disaster Relief Act; allowed aid to 
rural communities.  1965 1965 Hurricane Betsy 
Hurricane Betsy flooded large 
areas of New Orleans for 10 days, 
drowning 40 people. 
1970 1970 Hurricane Camille 259 deaths, ≈$9B damage (2015) Disaster Relief Act of 1970, PL-91-606 
Amended Disaster Relief Act to include temporary 
housing and relocation services.  
1972 1972 Rapid City Flood $160,000,000 (1972) 
≈$664,000,000 (2002) 
Flood Disaster Protection Act of 
1973, PL 93–234 
Expanded flood insurance, imposed sanctions on 
flood zones communities that fail to participate. 
1974 1974 Super Tornados Super outbreak of 315 tornados. Disaster Relief Amendments of 1974 
Defined “major disaster” and “emergencies.” 
Served as model until Stafford Act. In 1977, Act 
was re-authorized until 1980.  
1964-1971 1964 Good Friday & 1971 San Fernando Earthquake 
Good Friday- 139 deaths, ≈2.28B 
damage; San Fernando- 64 deaths, 
≈$553M in damage. 
National Earthquake Hazards 
Reduction Act 
Bill enacted to establish research for earthquake 
prediction and mitigation.  
1988 Various tornados, floods, hurricanes 
Possibly influenced by MX City 
Earthquake. 1988 Robert T. Stafford Act 
Increased emphasis on mitigation. Amended 
Disaster Relief Act 1974.  
1990 
1990- Loma Prieta earthquake, 
Hurricane Hugo, 1990 
Plainfield Tornados 
63 deaths and 3,757 injuries 
≈ $6B damage. Quake seemed to 
eclipse other natural disasters. 
Earthquake Hazard Reduction 
Amendments Act. Proposed. 
Changed NEHRP’s original focus on research to 
predict earthquakes.107 
1993 Great Flood of 1993, Storm of the Century  
1993 Robert T. Stafford Act 
Amendment Enhanced focus on mitigation 
2002 September 11, 2001 Terror Attacks  Homeland Security Act of 2002 Made FEMA part of new Dept. Homeland Security 
2005 Hurricanes Katrina & Rita 1,953 fatalities total. 
≈$108B/$12B damage.  
Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2006 
Emergency Management 
Authority Act of 2006 
Passed in 2006. Provided for overhaul to Homeland 
Security Act of 2002.108  
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IV. CONCEPT OF ISSUE ATTENTION AND POLICY WINDOWS 
I am concerned for the security of our great Nation; not so much because 




According to the Global Terrorism Index, published by the Institute for 
Economics and Peace, terrorist incidents worldwide have expanded more than 464 
percent since 2001.110 On a steady rise over the last decade, the largest increase in 
incidents of global terrorism occurred from 2007 to 2008, increasing 80 percent from 
2,500 to over 4,000.111 What may be more concerning than the increase in international 
terrorism is the comparatively low steady-state domestic terrorism activity. Of the 227 
documented terrorist events occurring within the U.S. since 2001, just over one percent 
made significant headlines, among those including the 2012 Consulate attacks in 
Benghazi and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.112  
On September 11, 2012, the armed group Ansar al-Saharia, Islamic militants 
aligned in ideology with al-Qaeda attacked the U.S. Consulate and a Central Intelligence 
Agency facility in Benghazi, Libya.113 During the multi-wave attack, four U.S. citizens 
were killed, including Ambassador Chris Stevens. The attacks in Benghazi, Libya were 
immediately shrouded in partisan controversy, which dominated the media post-event.  
                                                 
109 Edward T. Imparato, General MacArthur: Speeches and Reports 1908–1964 (Paducah, KY: 
Turner Publishing, 2000), 175.  
110 Institute for Economics and Peace, “Global Terrorism Index 2012,” 2012, 
http://tinyurl.com/bnx2pwx, 6.   
111 Ibid. 
112 Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism: Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/. Does not include sole actor events such as school and mass shootings 
akin to Sandy Hook and Aurora shootings. 
113 Select Committee on Intelligence, Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, 
Libya, September 11–12, 2012, Additional Views 113th Cong. (2013) (4–10), 
https://www.congress.gov/113/crpt/srpt134/CRPT-113srpt134.pdf. 
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Within seven months of the Benghazi attacks, a second attack was executed 
successfully, this time on U.S. soil at the famed Boston Marathon, which killed three and 
injuring 264 others. Two ethnically Chechen brothers, one of whom was placed on the 
National Counterterrorism Center’s terror watch list 18 months earlier, carried out the 
attack.114  
Contemporary theory on public policy and political influence suggests the 
dynamic of focused attention is largely made (intentionally or not) through media 
availability and public pressure on political leaders for resolution.115 What is focused on 
and the duration for which it gets attention is a result of what has been termed the issue-
attention cycle. Public opinion, as suggested in contemporary public policy literature, 
ostensibly aids in driving public policy cycles. This thesis in later chapters will 
demonstrate this theory may not be true in all cases. Media availability tends to drive 
public opinion as noted by Page, Shapiro, and Demsey and likely contributes to Gerston’s 
six factors, particularly scope.116  
A. ISSUE-ATTENTION 
The issue-attention cycle, a concept derived from economist Anthony Downs in 
his 1972 publication “Up and Down with Ecology: The ‘Issue-Attention Cycle,’” appears 
to have been first introduced to homeland security circles by Professors Sharon Wrobel 
                                                 
114 Mark Hosenball, “Boston Bomb Suspect’s Name was on Classified Government Watch Lists,” 
Reuters, April 24, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-usa-explosions-boston-suspect-
idUSBRE93N06720130424.  
115 Despite strong research data supporting the influence of media on public opinion and policy 
development, there are opposing arguments to what is termed the “CNN effect” on public policy outcomes 
and public opinion. See Warren P. Strobel, “The CNN Effect: How Much Influence Does the 24-hour 
News Network Really Have on Foreign Policy?” American Journalism Review (May 1996), Philip Merrill 
College of Journalism, accessed March 3, 2015, http://tinyurl.com/phmthgj; Benjamin Page, Robert 
Shapiro, and Glenn Dempsey, “What Moves Public Opinion?,” American Political Science Review,  81, no. 
1 (1987): 38, http://www.uvm.edu/~dguber/POLS234/articles/page1.pdf; John Peter, “Explaining Policy 
Change: The Impact of the Media, Public Opinion and Political Violence on Urban Budgets in England,” 
Journal of European Public Policy 13, no. 7 (2006): 1053–1068, http://tinyurl.com/ndks8e7.  
116 Page, Shapiro, and Demsey, “What Moves Public Opinion?” Also see Gerston, Public Policy 
Making, 24–28.    
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and David Connelly in 2002.117 The concept was reintroduced by Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security Professor Chris Bellavita in 
2005.118 
The issue-attention cycle, illustrated in Figure 4, is a five-stage cycle through 
which a given crisis or event of national significance is likely to develop. Stage one 
includes the pre-problem, whereby the issue at hand exists in a latent state, yet commands 
very little attention. Dr. Walter Green describes the components of this stage as a 
combination of “pre-indicators” and evolving conditions.119 Stage two occurs when the 
issue is thrust to the forefront of public attention. This stage is called the “alarmed 
discovery and euphoric enthusiasm.”120 During this stage, there will likely be a demand 
for action, similar to the overwhelming support of the war on terror in 2001.121 It is at 
this stage where the characteristics of a crisis will be most influential. The next stage is 
marked by the actualization of impacts to public life and subsequent costs of 
implementation (including economic, sociological, psychological, political, etc.). This 
stage is referred to as “realizing cost of significant progress.” Dr. Karen K. Petersen 
characterizes stage three as “the realization of the high costs and the low probability of 
success.”122 Stages four and five include a gradual decline to normalcy and entry into the 
post-problem stage. The post-problem stage can also be thought of as the pre-problem 
stage of the next crisis, although never quite relaxing entirely. At this stage, the issue will 
                                                 
117 Downs, “Up and Down with Ecology,” 28–50. See also: Sharon Wrobel and David Connelly, 
“Revisiting the Issue-Attention Cycle: New Perspectives and Prospects” (presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Boston, MA, August 2002, 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65828_index.html.  
118 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: The Issue-Attention Cycle,” Homeland 
Security Affairs 1, no. 1 (2005), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=1.1.1  
119 “Pre-indicators” in this stage are defined by Green as prodromes. The term is used to define latent 
pre-indicators that underlie an event yet are often not apparent until after the event has passed. Specifically, 
from the Latin root “pro,” meaning preceding, and “drome” meaning course. Walter Green, Command and 
Control of Disaster Operations (Boca Raton, FL: Universal Publishers, 2002), http://tinyurl.com/nf8dn3s, 
3–5.   
120 Jones and Baumgartner, Politics of Attention, 136.  
121 David Moore, “Support for War on Terrorism Rivals Support for WWII,” Gallup Polls, 2003, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/4954/support-war-terrorism-rivals-support-wwii.aspx.  
122 Karen K. Petersen, “Revisiting Downs’s Issue-Attention Cycle: International Terrorism and U.S. 
Public Opinion,” Journal of Strategic Security 2, no. 4 (2009): 1–16, 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1063&context=jss.  
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likely no longer produce the required political or public support for significant action, 
although it may still garner attention due to policy augmentation already made.123  
 
Figure 4.  Issue-Attention Cycle and Phases124 
There is much that can be inferred about the future by studying past trends. When 
looking historically at major national crises and the programs produced as a result of such 
crises, there is an evident decline in the public and political interest of those programs 
over time.125 Public programs that originated from the Great Depression and World War 
II, such as public works, defense, and economic policy, show at least one decade of 
heightened organizational activity immediately post-event before declining in 
organizational activity an average of 69 percent over the following 10 years.126 This 
decline is highly consistent with the decline of other major crises and is seen repeatedly. 
Although many of these historical programs have continued to fluctuate in issue-attention 
over time, public concern over terrorism, by contrast has decreased by 92 percent, a 22 
percent steeper decrease than the historical examples noted. Rather than fluctuate, 
terrorism has fallen to near zero percent interest according to 2013 records; this is in spite 
                                                 
123 Ibid.  
124 Downs, “The Issue-Attention Cycle,” 41. 
125 This observation is shared by contemporary studies on issue-attention and historical data. See Guy 
Peters and Brian Hogwood, “In Search of the Issue-Attention Cycle,” The Journal of Politics 47, no. 1 
(1985): 240.   
126 Ibid., 240–244.  
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of domestic and worldwide terrorism events that presumably should have regenerated or 
created some sustained interest.127 Other programs to show a similar pattern of rapid 
ascent and subsequent descent in issue attention include the war on drugs, which declined 
88 percent in 10 years—cycling in a near identical manner as terrorism.128  
The duration of the issue-attention cycle and what causes the cycle is also worth 
mentioning. Downs notes there are three distinct factors that determine whether a given 
issue will transition through the issue-attention cycle: 
• Only a relatively small segment of the population is affected;  
• Social arrangements of benefit (either to the majority or a powerful 
minority);  
• And the problem no longer has “intrinsically exciting qualities.”129  
All three of the aforementioned should present if an issue is to enter the cycle.  
Some events are noted by a rapid increase in public interest, an equally rapid 
decline and little time in the realization stage. An example of this would be the 
Minneapolis I-35W bridge collapse in 2007. The heightened attention rose rapidly and 
spurred local change to transportation infrastructure, but quickly declined to a pre-event 
or near pre-event state. “A Disaster Brought Awareness but Little Action on 
Infrastructure,” an article in the New York Times in March 2014, opined on the disaster, 
“Even catastrophe has failed to create a sense of urgency.”130 The article underscores the 
impacts of Downs’s third stage, the realization of costs of a solution. The decline of 
urgency is an example of Downs’s third factor for issue-attention cycle initiation—a lack 
of “intrinsically exciting qualities.”131 Additionally, Gerston’s characteristics may also be 
seen here. An initial increase in attention due to its emergence and salience quickly 
catches attention, but the resource implications, which would normally aid in sustaining 
                                                 
127 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (Albany: University of Albany, 2013): 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t212012.pdf, 106–107.   
128 Ibid. 
129 Downs, “The Issue-Attention Cycle,” 41. 
130 Haberman, “A Disaster Brought Awareness.”  
131 Downs, “The Issue-Attention Cycle,” 41.  
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the crisis in legislative attention, did not have other factors with which to interact (e.g., 
scale, intensity (number of fatalities, intent)).  
The Boston bombing shares similarities here. The rapid ascent in stage two, which 
transitioned nearly immediately to the crescendo apprehension and capture of the 
perpetrators, led to an equally rapid de-escalation to near normalcy. Another 
commonality Boston and the I-35W bridge collapse share is that both issues affected only 
a regional population. It is reasonable to suggest issue-attention may initiate, function, 
and complete the cycle regionally, while garnering relatively little national interest. The 
exception to this hypothesis would include events of national significance, such as 
September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina. Crises of this nature affect a specific region 
of the country geographically and therefore have very specific impacts locally. Yet their 
broader nationwide impacts are evident through policy influences, a result of significant 
changes in public opinion of the country’s preparedness.132 These examples of black 
swans (others include Deepwater Horizon, Exxon Valdez, and the financial crisis) have 
interplay between crisis characteristics resulting in more powerful attention durations. 
Protracted crises and social issues affecting a broad population are a contrast to 
the short-lived crises noted above. These complex crises and social issues continue to 
generate interest in varying degrees over a longer period of time (e.g., taxes, economy, 
immigration, terrorism). Figure 5 shows comparatively the attitudes of the U.S. toward 
the most important issues facing the country from 1998 to 2013 according to data 
compiled by the University at Albany, Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center. 
                                                 
132 September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina both resulted in significant changes to U.S. 
preparedness policy and noteworthy reorganization and investment in emergency preparedness and 
response protocols.  
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Figure 5.  Terrorism Public Interest133 
Public opinions of terrorism have been built in to Figure 5 to demonstrate the 
difference in various issues. In the case of terrorism, data shows an initial increase in 
issue-attention (heightened awareness) followed by a predictable decline and another 
smaller resurgence in attention. The war on drugs cycled in a near perfectly matching 
manner (see Figure 6.) This is an unusual pattern that appears consistently in episodic 
attention. Interestingly, the pattern appears on micro-cycles as well.  
Although Figure 6 is measured over a period of 18 years, after the police shooting 
in Ferguson, Missouri of an unarmed African American teenager on August 11, 2014, 
social media displayed over a period of 30 hours a startlingly similar logarithmic pattern 
with a regression correlation value indicating a very similar pattern in attention to those 
in Figure 6.134 These patterns of declination may best be explained by the diffusion of 
innovation phenomenon. Once the demand for attention is saturated, continued growth of 
attention rapidly declines to near zero and is quickly replaced by an entirely different 
competing demand for attention. 
                                                 
133 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, 106–107.   
134 Data is based on analysis of Tweets (#Ferguson) from August 9 to August 15, looking specifically 
at the night of August 13 through 15. Tweets were measured in tweets per minute from 11:41pm, August 
13 to 5:44am, August 15.  
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Figure 6.  War on Drugs and Terrorism Compared135 
Social issues, if they do not meet Downs’s criteria yet still affect a majority 
population, tend to fall in to a predictable rise and fall seemingly in lock-step with the 
presidential election cycle as seen with ethics, education, and taxes depicted in Figure 
5.136 Contemporary political science research suggests presidents and political experts 
have great deal of influence on the public opinion of the nation’s most important 
issues.137 These observations are consistent with findings described later in this thesis in 
Chapter V.  
B. CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY 
In crisis is opportunity. The implementation of the New Deal in the 1940s, the 
war on drugs, and the PATRIOT Act in 2001 are evidence of this fact. However, as seen 
in the example of Boston above, it is not true for every crisis. Characteristics of size, 
                                                 
135 Ibid. 
136 Gary Henry and Craig Gordon, “Tracking Issue Attention—Specifying the Dynamic of the Public 
Attention,” Public Opinion Quarterly 65, no.2 (2001): 169, http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/content/65/2/157.   
137 Page, “What Moves Public Opinion?,” 36; Wrobel and Connelly, “Revisiting the Issue-Attention 
Cycle.”  
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intensity, timing, resources, cause, and culpability, posited by Gerston, make the policy 
window possible. These characteristics work in concert to create an environment post-
crisis where change is possible; however, when quantified, the value of these 
characteristics also dictates the degree of emergent attention. The PATRIOT Act passed 
the Senate vote with an overwhelming majority of 98 to one, just 44 days after September 
11, 2001.138 It is unlikely this monumental legislation would have been so rapidly 
accomplished without following a national crisis.139 Rahm Emanuel, Chief of Staff of the 
Obama Administration in 2008, clearly recognized this when he stated, “You never want 
a serious crisis to go to waste...crisis provides the opportunity for us to do things that you 
could not do before.”140 This statement, made at the height of the 2008 financial crisis, 
succinctly alludes to the policy window post-crisis. The policy window is the limited 
timeframe available post-event to propose and enact relevant policy change. Accurately 
defining the rise and fall of issue-attention and the duration of the policy window is the 
next obvious step in academic research regarding this discipline in an effort to more 
accurately predict timing of legislation. More importantly, it is to better temper the 
reactive nature, either under or over-reactive after crisis.  
As homeland security continues to decline as a national issue and the nation lulls 
to a pre-September 11 state, it is arguable the collaborative efforts that were bolstered 
within the homeland security enterprise post-September 11 will also deteriorate. 
Homeland security funding continues to decrease, as is historically common with 
decreases in programmatic attention. It is reasonable to expect missions to consolidate 
and agency rivalries to emerge as resources become scarce.141 However, a declining 
budget environment may also have an inverse effect and give way to stronger interagency 
partnerships to meet mission demands.  
                                                 
138 “U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 107th Congress—1st Session,” October 25, 2001, 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=107&session=1&vo
te=00313.  
139 By the characteristics of Gerston, September 11, 2001 is one of the most impactful events of recent 
history.  
140 Seib, “In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama.”   
141 Peters and Hogwood, “In Search of the Issue-Attention Cycle,” 240.  
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Homeland security, as a national goal, an enterprise, and a department is 
inextricably linked to terrorism events like Benghazi and Boston. Consistent with 
contemporary findings on issue-attention, programmatic advancement and political 
attention are bound to public opinion.142 John Kingdon’s policy window finds its genesis 
from Downs’s issue-attention cycle. The intrinsically exciting qualities of the crisis as 
well as other features of Downs’s cycle result in the advent of the policy window. As the 
issue transitions through the cycle and policy is determined to be too costly or complex, 
such was the case of the I-35W bridge collapse, the issue wanes and attention decreases, 
as does allocated resources (fiscal and otherwise). The closing of the policy window is 
commensurate with the final stages of the issue-attention cycle. The nominal impact of 
Benghazi and Boston on a majority of the population failed to generate the necessary 
public support and thereby resulted in the lack of a potential policy window post-event.  
It is arguable whether these two events ever entered the issue-attention cycle at 
all. According to Downs’s criteria, there needs to be a majority population affected. This 
simply was not the case in either of these events. Although the events of Boston 
captivated a nation as it unfolded, only a smaller population rather than a whole nation 
felt the primary and secondary impacts of the event. Therefore, the event would not have 
entered the cycle. It is plausible the issue transitioned through the cycle at the regional-
level without ever emerging fully to a national issue. This is precisely the reason the 
characteristics posed in this thesis are the preferred measure for determining a crises’ 
potential for emergent attention as they account appropriately for the various 
characteristics of the crisis, including scope, intensity, timing, resources, cause and fault.  
Regime instability, caused by new and emerging crisis, tends to result in policy 
uncertainty. Kettl notes, “The punctuated equilibrium model argues that this is precisely 
when big changes in government occur. Stress shakes up the system. Public officials 
react by… dramatically shifting priorities, and living the ‘everything has changed’ 
                                                 
142 Wrobel and Connelly, “Revisiting the Issue-Attention Cycle,” 5; Henry and Gordon, “Tracking 
Issue Attention;” John, “Explaining Policy Change.”   
 47 
mantra.”143 Following chapters examine specifically emergent attention in Congress and 
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V. EXAMINING EMERGENT ATTENTION IN CONGRESS 
A. DATA SELECTION  
The issue-attention cycle, introduced in Chapter IV, illustrates the process by 
which an issue captivates attention. When combined with Figure 1 and Table 1, the 
interrelated nature of the theories of public policy become clearly evident. Close 
examination of the patterns of governance, particularly after crisis, can better elucidate 
the dynamics of issue-attention and reactive behavior in government. This is particularly 
important in homeland security, as no agency seems to be more connected (and thereby 
reactive) to crisis than the homeland security enterprise. The dynamics of crisis attention 
can be continuously dissected to progressively reveal a more precise picture of legislative 
behavior post-crisis. In this chapter, this author will examine the constituent parts making 
up emergent attention post-crisis. Particularly, this chapter examines what characteristics 
of a crisis most strongly correlate to emergent attention by examining the relationship 
between crises and Gerston and Rochefort’s characteristics of crises.  
The research of this thesis to investigate the question of what precipitates 
congressional attention post-crises considered a broad variety of crises and catastrophes 
from the recent past. To discover what variables are more prone to prompt a rise in 
congressional attention, a variety of events were selected, varying in size, type, severity 
of impacts, and aftermath. The variety of crises examined in the analysis are key to the 
hypothesis of this study- that there are specific variables that enable and accelerate the 
emergence of attention post-crisis and give an issue the power to compel change in 
political opinion. Table 3 is a summary list of the crises in this research:  
Table 3.   Selected Crises 
September 11, 2001 Aids Illegal immigration 
Katrina NSA Global warming 
Housing crisis Enron Social security 
Economic crash Northridge ISIS 
Ebola Ferguson VA crisis 
Unaccompanied migrant children 1960s riots Exxon 
Hurricane Andrew Corporate scandal MC252 oil spill 
Child obesity Bosnia Oklahoma City Bombing 
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The data used in this study was aggregated primarily from the University of Texas Austin 
and the Library of Congress. Table 4 depicts the sources of data and the timeframe of 
data gathered from those sources.  
Table 4.   Source Types and Data 
Source- Dates available- Data retrieved from source- 
Library of Congress For information pre-1946 Includes no. of hearings/ hearing data for 
issues. 
Political Agenda Project  From 1946–2013 Hearings, media data, presidential remarks, 
etc. 
Congress.com  From 2012–1014 No. of hearings, reports, committee activity 
on given issues.  
 
Codebooks and datasets reflecting congressional hearings, New York Times 
publications, public opinion polling, among others, were used to support the positions of 
this thesis.144 Data on congressional hearings from 2010 to current were collated from 
Congress.gov. To validate previous data or for any data required prior to 1945, the 
National Archives was used. 
Crises selected for this study (listed above) vary in size, impact, and how they 
affect the public. Some issues selected have long gestation periods, developing over 
years, and yet other selected events emerge in a matter of days. Some have immediate 
and very visible impacts whereas other selected events may not have any direct, tangible 
impact at all. For this study, the variables examined were selected first, then a sample of 
crises was selected that best showed diversity in size, scale, scope, frequency, and 
economic or resource impacts. Doing so provided the best method of determining how 
specific variables affected dissimilar crises. The differentiation of variables and crises is 
depicted in Figure 7.  
                                                 
144 May, Joachim and Sapotichne, “Policy Regime and Governance,” 13.  
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Figure 7.  Event, Feature, and Characteristics 
Determining the potential influence of an emerging problem is achieved through 
the assignment of numerical values to characteristics of crises, differentiating the value of 
one crisis from another. The characteristics selected for this study are based in part on 
those presented by Gerston, Rochefort, and Cobb.145 Several additional variables were 
added to Gerston’s theories to differentiate the causal factors surrounding the emerging 
problem and to account for human involvement and culpability. The added characteristics 
were selected based on their use in other political science and problem-emergence theory, 
such Anthony Downs’s issue-attention cycle (discussed in Chapter IV) and work by 
Rochefort and Cobb (see literature review).146 The six characteristics have been assigned 
a scalable numerical values based on their degree of severity and how substantially they 
affected the emerging crisis. Table 5 shows the qualitative and quantitative assignments 
have been given to each characteristic. 
Table 5.   Characteristics of Crisis 
Scope (s) Narrow (city-wide)= 1 Moderate (regional/ statewide)=2 Broad (national)= 3 
Intensity (i) Low (no deaths, 
injuries, no major 
destruction, no 
economic impacts) = 1 
Uneven (few deaths, injuries, 
little major destruction, slow to 
medium emergence, little 
economic impacts) = 2 
High (significant 
impacts to life, safety, 
property, economy) = 3 
Time (t) Gradual (> 1 year) = 1 Moderate (4 mos. to 1 year) = 2 Rapid (< 4 mos.) = 3 
Resources (r) Few = 1 Medium = 2 Significant = 3 
Fault (fa) Accident/unrelated = 1 Oversight = 2 Intentional = 3 
Cause (c) Natural = 1 Manmade = 2 -- 
                                                 
145 Gerston, Public Policy Making, 30.  
146 Rochefort and Cobb, The Politics of Problem Definition, 21.  
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Within Table 5, the novelty of the event may influence the perceived intensity and 
salience of the problem, and therefore may influence the value of intensity. Other factors 
to consider concerning the variable of timing include the event frequency. A higher 
frequency of similar powerful events may result in greater influence on the overall 
perception of the issue.   
Taking the product of the first four characteristics and adding the remaining 
values for fault and cause, whether natural or manmade, will represent the total value of 
the combined six characteristics from Table 5. The result will be the net value of the 
crisis, represented by the variable (m). 
In determining a crises’ final value, T equals m multiplied by the number of 
hearings the issue receives from Congress over time. Vi represents the number of 
congressional hearings occurring at the initial emergence of the crisis. Vf represents the 
number of hearings on the crisis at the highest point prior to decline. The time span of 
emergence (in years) from initial hearings to the hearings’ highest point is represented by 
t.147 Once acceleration is determined, it is multiplied by m, resulting in the total value of 
the crisis, T. This treatment was done in an effort to determine whether there are any 
similarities between emerging crises in Congress and, more importantly, to determine if 
greater values of variables correlate in any way to the number of hearings an issue 
receives.  
Congressional hearings used to populate this study are cataloged using two 
sources, University of Texas Austin College of Liberal Arts Public Policy collections and 
the Library of Congress for hearings after 2010. Each source provides an aggregated list 
of all hearings on a particular topic. The data is collected in spreadsheets and counted for 
the number of times a particular set of words matching with the crisis arise, either within 
the title or the hearing description, for instance the term “terrorism,” such as found in 
Hearing before the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism to Review Department of State 
2000 Report on Trends in International Terrorism.  
Table 6 shows an example of this method using the issue of Hurricane Katrina.  
                                                 
147 The equation ((vf-vi)/t) represents the acceleration of the emerging crisis.  
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Table 6.   Description of Data Treatment Method 
Characteristic Description Value Determination Method 
Scope (s) Moderate (regional) 2  Size of geographic impact 
Intensity (i) High (significant) 3 How violent was storm? 
Time (t) Rapid (< 4 mos.) 3 How quickly did it occur? 
Resources (r) Significant 3 What was the cost? 
Fault (fa) Accident/unrelated 1 Was their fault? 
Cause (c) Natural 1 What was the cause? 
Sub Total (m)  56 Product from above. 
Initial hearings (vi)  0 Searched for subject and in-text terms: 
“Katrina, Hurricane, Flooding, Recovery” in 
years immediately following.  
 
Hearings at height (vf)  76 
Total hearings  208 Total no. hearings. 
No. of years  3 Total yrs discussed. 
Average/ yr (total/t) 69 Rounded to nearest whole. 
Acceleration ((vf-vi)/t)  25 Hearings at start subtracted from hearings at 
height divided by year. Total is multiplied by 
initial value. Total value, T (m)*((vf-vi)/t)  1418 
 
Table 7 contains the results of all 25 events using the method described above in Table 6. 
All results are approximated, rounded to the nearest whole number.  
 54 





































































9/11 3 3 3 3 3 2 86 4 46 232 3 77 14 1204 
Katrina 2 3 3 3 1 1 56 0 76 208 4 52 19 1064 
Fin. Crisis 3 3 2 3 2 2 58 8 69 100 3 33 20 1179 
Exxon  2 3 3 2 2 2 40 3 30 33 1 33 27 1080 
MC252 2 3 3 2 2 2 40 1 27 28 1 28 26 1040 
ISIS 1 3 3 3 3 2 32 1 26 36 1 36 25 800 
Ebola 3 2 3 2 1 2 39 0 19 19 1 19 19 741 
Global W. 3 2 2 2 1 1 26 1 66 175 3 58 21 563 
UAC 2 3 2 2 2 2 28 94 185 292 5 58 18 509 
VA Crisis 3 2 2 2 2 2 28 3 18 18 1 18 15 420 
ENRON  3 1 3 2 2 2 22 1 34 42 2 21 17 363 
Andrew 2 3 3 2 1 1 38 1 9 14 1 14 8 304 
NSA 3 2 2 2 2 2 28 1 9 9 1 9 8 224 
Recession 3 2 2 3 2 2 40 1 23 85 4 21 6 220 
Corp.  3 1 2 1 2 2 10 6 40 46 2 23 17 170 
North EQ 2 3 2 3 1 1 38 1 5 5 1 5 4 152 
SSA 2 2 1 2 1 2 11 7 64 130 7 18 8 90 
Riot (60s) 2 2 2 2 3 2 21 0 8 17 5 3 2 34 
AIDs  3 2 1 2 1 2 15 1 24 60 8 7 3 43 
Ferguson  2 2 3 2 3 2 29 0 1 1 1 1 1 29 
OKC  3 2 3 1 3 2 23 4 7 13 2 6 1.5 35 
Bosnia  1 3 3 1 3 2 14 1 3 4 1 4 2 28 
Global  3 1 1 2 1 1 8 9 49 327 21 15 2 15 
Ill. Imm. 2 1 1 2 1 2 7 11 37 687 64 10 1 3 
Obesity  3 1 1 2 1 2 9 4 5 9 4 2 1 2 
Event Names Key 
9/11 VA Crisis- Veteran’s Affairs Corp.- Corporate Scandals 
Fin. Crisis- Financial Crisis Global W.- Global Warming OKC – Oklahoma City Bombings 
Exxon- Exxon Valdez Enron –Enron Collapse Bosnia – Bosnian Massacre (1995) 
MC252- Deepwater Horizon  House Cr.- Housing Crisis 1960s riots- U.S. Civil Rights Riots 
Katrina North. EQ- Northridge Earthquake AIDs – AIDS epidemic 
ISIS NSA- NSA Leaks Fergus – Ferguson , MO Riots 
Ebola SSA- Social Security Crisis Climate- Climate Change 
UAC- Unaccompanied Children H. And- Hurricane Andrew Ill. Imm.- Illegal Immigration 
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B. CHALLENGES IN DATA TREATMENT 
The application of quantitative measures to substitute for qualitative descriptors 
for each crisis presented a challenge that has yet to be resolved. The method was used 
despite reservations because the treatment of data is merely to represent changes due to a 
crises’ characteristics and congressional attention received; therefore, exact measures 
would not greatly enhance the result. When applying general numerical values to 
characteristics such as scope, intensity, or period of gestation, the same values cannot be 
assigned to different characteristics used to describe disparate problems or events. For 
example, the riots in Ferguson, Missouri, which occurred on November 23, 2014, 
emerged very rapidly, consistent with the crises’ emergence on social media.148 The riots 
also ranked high due to their intensity and violent nature. Other crises ranking high in the 
same categories include September 11, 2001, the emergence of Islamic State of Iraq and 
ash-Sham (ISIS) as a threat to the U.S., and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010. As 
noted previously, because the assignment of quantitative values to emerging events is for 
illustrative purposes (e.g., to examine emerging events generally against other dissimilar 
events), the method was used despite the drawback.  
The data was then analyzed two ways. First, all 25 events were plotted using a 
scatter plot with the total value of a crisis (including degree of congressional attention) 
representing the x-axis and the total characteristic value of the crisis representing the y-
axis (see Figure 8). The x-axis was selected due to its reflection of the change in 
congressional attention on the issue, which is one of the core questions this thesis is 
seeking to answer.  
                                                 
148 At the Ferguson’s height of emergence, the issue garnered approximately 4,000 tweets a minute on 
Twitter, totaling nearly 1.3M tweets in one night, surpassing other current issues such as Ebola and ISIS 
combined. Analyzed using Topsy.com.  
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Figure 8.  Distribution of Emerging Crises, Measured by Congressional 
Hearings 
As illustrated by Figure 8, crises fall into three distinct clusters,  
based on values.  
1. Cluster (a)  
The largest cluster of issues are domestic and special interest issues, including the 
1960s riots, Ferguson riots, AIDS, National Security Agency (NSA) leaks, childhood 
obesity, and social security. Thirteen issues make up this cluster grouping. These crises 
make up the majority of samples in the study. Crises in cluster (a) have a low T-value and 
low net value (e.g., either they elicit very little attention, or the attention they do induce 
occurs over a long period). Crises comprising cluster (a) are predominantly domestic in 
nature: special interest, immigration, civil riaghts, etc.149 Crises such as climate change 
and immigration, which are also included, change in attention over time. Changes in 
emergence of issues within cluster (a) are what comprise Downs’s 1972 thesis on issue-
attention. Crises within this cluster tend to be social problems. In his work on wicked 
problems and emerging politics, Dr. Rittel suggests, “Social problems are never solved. 
At best they are only re-solved—over and over again.”150 Also included in cluster (a) are 
more localized natural disasters, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and smaller hurricanes.  
                                                 
149 Average of 3.5 congressional hearings annually per event; cluster (a).  
150 Horst Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 
4, no. 1 (1973): 155–169.  
 57 
2. Cluster (b)  
The second cluster of issues includes larger domestic and international problems, 
including the Veteran’s Affairs crisis and corporate scandals, ISIS, and Ebola. In this 
cluster are groupings of what Rittel termed “wicked problems.”151 Crises in this cluster 
are complex, but they typically do not effect individuals immediately (either financially 
or physically).152  
3. Cluster (c)  
The final cluster of problems is the extreme of extremes—Taleb’s black swan 
events. These are the emerging problems that are very complex and cause significant and, 
more importantly, immediate impact to the greatest number. Cluster (c) is comprised of 
crises with high resource costs and broad impact, coupled with rapid emergence. Impacts 
are environmental (Deepwater Horizon and Exxon Valdez), emotional (Katrina and 9/11), 
or economic (arguably the 2008 economic crisis). Data shows that issues falling in the 
latter cluster (top 20 percent) described above emerged twice as quickly and averaged 
twice the number of congressional hearings annually as the remaining 80 percent. The 
distribution of data points indicate the fact not all issues garner the same amount of 
congressional attention and that issues of a certain type and complexity elicit a more 
urgent response.  
The indication that not all crises are weighted equally and garner the same 
response is a promising finding in supporting the thesis that specific variables have 
distinct effects on the emergence of attention post-crisis. In the following chapter, each 
cluster are examined using statistical analysis to validate whether this hypothesis can be 
supported or whether it should be rejected as false. In Figure 8, there is a clear positive 
increase in the degree of attention as it emerges. An important question here is whether 
importance or congressional attention came first. This question has been addressed at 
several points in this thesis, particularly Chapter II on the emergence of environmental 
policies after the Santa Barbara oil spill and again in Chapter IV with issue-attention. 
                                                 
151 Ibid., 160. 
152 Average of 15.9 congressional hearings annually per event; cluster (b).  
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When examining attention by category rather than by crisis, in most all cases 
punctuated increases in attention could be attributed to a specific precipitating event. An 
example of emerging attention due to external forces might be the increase in attention to 
social security in the 1990s. By the early to mid-1990s, federal deficit and 
macroeconomics was identified by Gallup polling as one of the most important problems 
facing Americans.153 In response to public opinion, in 1996, President Bill Clinton 
declared in a radio address to Americans a five-year plan to overhaul the social security 
system. Congressional attention to the issue increased directly as a result of the 
proclamation, as illustrated in Figure 9. In some cases, as discussed in Chapter IV, the 
ebb and flow of attention is due to the presidential election cycle as much as it is to actual 
or perceived need, such as occurs post-crisis. This dynamic of political ebb and flow is 
evident in the increases in 1976, 1980, 1984, and 1988 (Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9.  Congressional Hearings on Social Security, 1945–2010 
In cases such as the above, the degree of attention does not appear to be 
influenced by the same characteristics governing crises. Rather, it appears public interest 
and political election cycles tend to more strongly influence these issues.  
In Chapter V, qualitative values were derived for specific characteristics of crises 
and correlated to the rate of emergence of congressional attention post-crisis. Three 
distinct clusters of crises evident in the plotted data include black swans, wicked 
problems, and complex, longer-term social crises. With this information, the following 
chapters will conduct a more in-depth analysis, examining specifically at what rate 
                                                 
153 Jeffrey M. Jones, “Budget Rises as Most Important Problem to Highest Since ‘96,” Gallup, April 
13, 2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/147086/budget-rises-most-important-problem-highest.aspx   
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attention emerges, and how strongly the emergence correlates to the characteristics 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF CRISIS COMPARISON 
The idea that the future is unpredictable is undermined every day by the 
ease with which the past is explained.  
Daniel Kahneman154 
A. CONGRESSIONAL ATTENTION 
In 2011, late on a Sunday afternoon in May, a catastrophic F-5 tornado, which 
was part of a larger super cell of severe weather, ripped through the city of Joplin, 
Missouri. The tornado, which was part of a larger severe storm system, was nearly a mile 
wide when it touched down and lasted nearly 40 minutes. The massive tornado left a path 
of destruction 22 miles long, causing nearly $3 billion in damages, and resulting in 158 
fatalities.155 The Joplin tornado was the first F-5 tornado in Missouri since 1950.156 The 
2011 storm season ranks as one of the most intense; April 2011 had 753 tornados, the 
most active ever recorded. In total, 364 people lost their lives. The Natural Hazards Risk 
Reduction Act of 2011 was introduced in the late spring of 2011 but was killed in 
Congress shortly thereafter.157 
One of the core underlying questions of this thesis is, “What do we pay attention 
to and why?” When crises occur, determining which crisis is most likely to cause 
significant reaction in issue-attention has far reaching implications, enabling decision-
makers, and policy officials to prepare proposals for restructuring, mitigation, and 
preparedness in advance of the impending attention boon. Furthermore, officials with a 
more acute sense of when issues emerge and dissipate will likely be successful at 
                                                 
154 Daniel Kahneman and Ivan Tversky, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2011), 218. 
155 “Missouri Department of Insurance Says Joplin Disaster Will be the Most Costly Insurance Payout 
in State History,” Live Insurance News, July 27, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/ob75uv5.  
156 “F5 and EF5 Tornadoes of the United States 1950 to Present,” Storm Prediction Center, March 15, 
2015, http://www.spc.noaa.gov/faq/tornado/f5torns.html.  
157 “Natural Hazards Risk Reduction Act of 2011, S. 646, 112th Congress (2011–2012),” accessed 
March 3, 2015, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s646.  
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identifying funding and developing timely programs. The most obvious implications are 
to those of strategic communications post-crisis. 
The following chapter provides an analysis of the dataset in Table 7 and the 
scatter plot in Figure 8 and draws conclusions based on the data. Additionally, a selection 
of crises will be examined by category, such as natural disasters. This will provide both 
the broader view of the crisis as it relates to other crises, as well as the crisis in 
relationship to other crises of its type.  
In Chapter V (Figure 8), the mean rate of emergence of congressional attention 
for the entire sampling of 25 crises examined in this study was approximately 21 hearings 
per year over an average of 6.4 years. Crises that show the lowest rates of emergence in 
congressional attention include complex domestic and civil issues with low numbers of 
fatalities and economic impacts. Issues of this kind include childhood obesity (2.25 
hearings per year); riots due to civil rights, such as the LA riots and Ferguson, Missouri 
(one hearing); and the AIDS epidemic in 1980s (7.5 hearings per year).158 More complex 
issues having a broad impact across society (e.g., having potential to affect all citizens 
rather than a particular minority or special interest group) result in higher congressional 
attention, between 10 and 15 hearings annually, but indicate an extremely low emergence 
rate annually (≈0.4–2 respectively) because they are heard over a very long period. 
Examples include climate change (24 years) and immigration (64 years). The data 
revealed in this study reaffirms an observation by Rochefort and Cobb, who suggest 
“global warming is an illustration of an issue whose severity is debated with disputants 
vehemently disagreeing over its extent, timing, and impact.”159 Interestingly, as crises 
transform over time, so does attention. The fore mentioned—immigration and climate 
change—both adapted accordingly in congressional attention as the dynamics of the 
issues changed, caused by the influx of unaccompanied children across U.S. southern 
borders and the emerging scientific evidence supporting global warming. Unaccompanied 
children, due to an unprecedented increase in the number of children across the border, 
                                                 
158 Riots in the 1960s caused congressional hearings to increase to a rate of approximately 3.4 
annually over a period of five years, totaling 17 hearings. The Los Angeles riots after 1990 Rodney King 
decision did not result in congressional attention.  
159 Rochefort and Cobb, The Politics of Problem Definition, 17.  
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the amount of resources and money required to address the crisis, and the crisis’ 
emergence rate, changed from merely an issue of immigration to a wicked problem. The 
change increased the number of hearings on the immigration by over 400 percent, from 
10 hearings annually to nearly 60.  
Global warming and climate change share a similar dynamic. Global warming, a 
subset of climate change, has increased in attention rapidly due to a sharp increase in 
global warming’s rate of emergence and the resources required to mitigate the problem. 
These changes in the dynamics of the crisis have resulted in increased congressional 
attention by ≈56 percent, but more striking, the rate of emergence has increased from a 
mean of 1.9 hearings over 21 years to approximately 15 hearings over three years.  
In the study of the accelerated emergence of attention over time, illustrated in 
Figure 10, the crises examined for this study fall out into three distinct groupings. The 
acceleration rates of a majority of emerging crises, as illustrated in Figure 10, fall within 
the range of zero to eight hearings per year on the scale of acceleration. 
 
Figure 10.  Rate of Acceleration of Congressional Hearings 
A second distinct cluster of crises can be seen ranging from 14 to 22 hearings 
annually. These consist of black swans and wicked problems lacking culpability or a 
responsible party. This strongly suggests that crises where fault is a factor elicit attention 
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emergent issues result 
in lower avg. hearings 
in congress. Ex. Civil 




Domestic issue w/ 
no culpability. I.e., 
VA, Katrina, Ebola, 







at a more frenetic pace than when culpability and blame are not factors. This observation 
later supported via statistical analysis. Finally, crises that have associated culpability 
make up the final 90th to 95th percentile. When combining data from Figure 8 and 
probability analysis cluster (a), represented by 50 percent of emerging crises, has mean 
“resource” value of ≈1.8. Each subsequent cluster grouping is at least 0.4 points higher in 
value than the previous cluster. This effect demonstrates that as a crisis becomes more 
resource intensive, its rate of emergence increases as a result. 
A second probability analysis was conducted to examine the net value of crises 
noted in Figure 8 and Table 7. In terms of probability, crises that make up the 25th to 
50th percentile include those having only tangential impact to the public, including 
among others, global warming, childhood obesity, and the Bosnian massacres in 1998. 
The more moderate issues include those that signal more rapid emergence due to higher 
intensity and greater resource impacts (the housing market crash; corporate scandal such 
as Enron and the AIG collapse, and on the higher end, Hurricane Katrina, Exxon Valdez, 
and Deepwater Horizon). The highest (least likely but highest amount of influence) 
include the financial collapse and September 11, 2001.  
Probability analysis and data in Figure 8 provided a great deal of information as to 
the behavior of emerging crises and in some cases eluded to a relationship to Gerston and 
Rochefort’s characteristics of crises. However, to support the stated hypotheses of this 
thesis, the combined relationship between characteristics and crises as well as each 
individual characteristic and each crisis would need to be evaluated. The examples above 
underscore that characteristics defining a crisis do indeed influence the degree of 
congressional attention a crisis will receive. As proposed in Chapter I of this thesis, there 
are five predictions made regarding the influence of characteristics on emerging attention, 
entailing five corresponding null hypothesis-alternative hypothesis pairings. 
1. For the influence of combined characteristics on crises: 
Null hypothesis (H0): Specific characteristics, such as intensity, gestation, 
resources, size, and fault, when combined are not statistically significant 
contributors to the emergence of congressional attention post-crisis. 
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): Specific characteristics, such as intensity, gestation, 
resources, size, and fault, when combined are contributors to the 
emergence of congressional attention post-crisis. 
2. For the influence of characteristics on crises independently: 
Null hypothesis (H0): The characteristics’ size, resources, and fault 
independently are not statistical significant contributors to the emergence 
of congressional attention post-crisis. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The characteristics’ size, resources, and fault, 
independently are statistical significant contributors to the emergence of 
congressional attention. 
3. For the influence of select characteristics on crises independently: 
Null hypothesis (H0): Characteristics, such as intensity, timing, and cause, 
measurably influence the emergence of congressional attention post-crisis 
when occurring independently. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Characteristics, such as intensity, timing, and cause, do 
not measurably influence the emergence of congressional attention post-
crisis when occurring independently. 
4. For the influence of characteristics on various categories of crises: 
Null hypothesis (H0): Specific characteristics, such as intensity, gestation, 
resources, size, and fault, when combined do not result in a statistically 
significant difference in emergent of attention during black swans and 
complex social crises, compared to crises such as wicked problems. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Specific characteristics, such as intensity, gestation, 
resources, size, and fault, when combined result in a statistically 
significant difference in emergent of attention during black swans and 
complex social crises, compared to crises such as wicked problems. 
5. For the influence of economic impacts and fatalities on congressional 
attention: 
Null hypothesis (H0): Specific characteristic subsets of intensity such as 
number of fatalities and economic impacts cannot be correlated to an 
increase in the number of congressional hearings. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Specific characteristic subsets of intensity such as 
number of fatalities and economic impacts influence the number of 
congressional hearings post-crisis. 
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To test the fore mentioned hypotheses, two tests were used. The first test, the 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), tests whether one or more independent 
variables correlates to two or more dependent variables. The second test employed was 
the univariate analysis, which was used as a verification of findings. Both tests were 
conducted using IBM’s SPSS® platform. All tests were conducted using a confidence 
level of 95 percent (significance level α = 0.05) unless otherwise specified. During the F-
test analysis using MANOVA, the Wilks’s lambda (λ) and the associated F-ratio were 
sought. Lambda is a measure of the percent of variance in the dependent variable (D.V.) 
that is not explained by variances in the level of the independent variable (I.V.). Lambda 
adjusts between zero and one; the closer to zero the value, the less variance that is not 
explained by the I.V.  
1. Hypothesis 1 
Statistical analysis clearly upholds the first hypothesis, which predicted an 
influence of the combined characteristics on the congressional attention given to an 
emerging crisis. A one-way MANOVA revealed a highly significant multivariate main 
effect for the combined total characteristic value, revealing a Wilks’s λ = 0.001, F = 4.04 
(54, 9.75), P < 0.01. Thus, hypothesis 1 was confirmed and the null hypothesis rejected. 
This result alone is sufficient support for this thesis, that specific qualitative 
characteristics of crises, when quantified and combined, accurately describe the 
emergence of congressional attention post-crisis as posited by Gerston, Rochefort, and 
others.  
2. Hypothesis 2  
For the influence of characteristics on crises independently, 25 crises in total were 
evaluated, testing the null hypothesis, where each individual characteristic was treated as 
an independent variable, and total congressional hearings as the dependent variable. The 
results are included in Table 8. Results of the MANOVA indicate of the six 
characteristics, only three of the six demonstrated statistical significance, and only one of 
the four—scope—demonstrated high significance. Cause of the crisis appears to have the 
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least effect on congressional attention, according to MANOVA results. Thus, hypothesis 
2 was confirmed and the null hypothesis rejected. 
Table 8.   MANOVA—Individual Characteristics of Crisis 
Event Group Description (α = 0.05 in all MANOVA  Result Significance H0 
1. All 25 
Crises 
MANOVA—Compared T (total value) 
to congressional hearings, avg. rate of 
hearings, acceleration 
Wilks’s λ = 0.00 
F= 4.04 (54/ 9.75) 




2. Ea. Value 
Independently 
MANOVA—Scope (independent 
variable) v. congressional hearings 
(dependent variable) 
Wilks’s λ = 0.04 
F= 14.4 (4/4) 





variable) v. congressional hearings 
(dependent variable) 
Wilks’s λ = 0.057 
F= 3.17 (4/4) 






variable) v. congressional hearings 
(dependent variable) 
Wilks’s λ = 0.030 
F= 4.77 (4/4) 






variable) v. congressional hearings 
(dependent variable) 
Wilks’s λ = 0.02 
F= 6.03 (4/4) 
P = < 0.05 
Significant Rejected 
MANOVA—Fault (independent 
variable) v. congressional hearings 
(dependent variable) 
Wilks’s λ = 0.026 
F= 37.36 (2/2) 
P = < 0.026 
Significant Rejected 
MANOVA—Cause (independent 
variable) v. congressional hearings 
(dependent variable) 
Wilks’s λ = 0.085 
F= 2.43 (4/4) 





Black Swans ANOVA/Regression—Compared T 
(total value) to congressional hearings, 
avg. rate of hearings, acceleration 
Wilks’s λ = 0.00 
F = 978.8 




MANOVA—Compared T (total value) 
to congressional hearings, avg. rate of 
hearings, acceleration 
Wilks’s λ = 0.005 
F= 16.98 (11/ 1) 







MANOVA—Compared T (total value) 
to congressional hearings, avg. rate of 
hearings, acceleration 
Wilks’s λ = 0.54 
F= 0.17 (5/1) 






This finding clearly establishes that not all characteristics influence emerging 
crisis in the same manner, but rather that some are more significant than others. This 
finding also illustrates, when considered with the initial hypothesis of this study (H1), that 
the combined effect of two or more crisis characteristics is more powerful than each 
characteristic individually. This is an interesting finding suggesting a compound effect 
caused by characteristics. This makes sense and helps explain why some crises seem to 
garner significant attention and others do not.  
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3. Hypothesis 3  
For the influence of select characteristics on crises independently, namely 
intensity and cause, a one-way MANOVA was conducted whereby the two 
characteristics were tested separately (I.V.) against total congressional attention, average, 
and acceleration of hearings (D.V.), which resulted in a statistically insignificant response 
in both cases. The results of the MANOVA testing exceeded the confidence interval in 
both cases; therefore, hypothesis 3 was confirmed and the null hypothesis rejected. This 
finding confirms the findings of H3, that neither cause nor intensity has a statistically 
significant influence on emerging attention post-crisis when considered independently of 
one another. Furthermore, it was discovered timing (i.e., how rapidly an event emerges) is 
also statistically insignificant as an independent characteristic.  
4. Hypothesis 4  
To attain a more exact measure of how different types of crises affect 
congressional hearings, the three clusters of events introduced in Chapter V were tested 
separately using MANOVA and univariate testing for each crisis type. Black swan 
events, those making up the top 20 percent of crises in the sample, when analyzed 
revealed interesting findings.  
First, upon examining the influence of combined characteristics on black swans 
(top 20 percent of the total sample) when testing the null hypothesis, a one-way 
MANOVA revealed a statistically significant multivariate main effect for the combined 
total characteristic value of black swans, revealing a Wilks’s λ = 0.001, F = 978.9 (3,1), P 
< 0.02. These findings were consistent with both the F-test and Pearson coefficient test 
for black swans. The findings revealed a significant correlation between the value of the 
crises’ characteristics (I.V.) and the total number and average number of congressional 
hearings, and the rate of acceleration of attention (D.V). Results were just slightly lower 
than when included in the sample of all 25 crises. This demonstrated clearly not all crises 
correlate in the same manner. Interestingly, in the Pearson test, the relationship between 
the crisis value of black swans and the acceleration of issue-attention revealed a high but 
negative correlation. This is due to the fact that crises with the highest, most rapid 
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number of hearings also have the largest decline in hearings when compared to other 
black swans that may garner fewer hearings, thereby resulting in a smaller decline over a 
shorter period. These findings are consistent with the results of the MANOVA testing.  
Wicked problems, the second cluster of crises, resulted in a Wilks’s λ = 0.005, F-
value = 16.98 (11/1), P = 0.19. Due to the statistical insignificant findings, a Pearson 
correlation test was conducted. The Pearson coefficient R-values were not as strong as 
those seen in the black swan test. The wicked problem demonstrates a moderate negative 
correlation, meaning as the crisis value of a wicked problem increases, the number of 
hearings decrease, as does the mean. These values are likely due to the issues of global 
warming and unaccompanied children. Both are significantly complex issues. Although 
the resources they currently require and their frequency are both low, the amount of 
attention they receive is very high because of their salience. What is interesting about 
these two issues is that they reside in two domains (i.e., they have shifted from one 
domain to another due to changing characteristic values). Take for example the issue of 
unaccompanied children. In 2014, 46,932 unaccompanied children were apprehended at 
the U.S. border, over twice the number from two years earlier and over four-times those 
apprehended in 2008.160 As a result of the rapidly increased intensity of the issue, the 
short period over which the issue increased, and the dramatic increase in the amount of 
resources needed to combat the issue, the crisis itself changes in the attention it 
commands. In this example, the rate of acceleration of attention changed from .4 to 18.2 
and the average rate of hearings from ten hearings annually to 58 annually.  
Finally, the third cluster of crises, which tend to be localized or socially complex 
resulted in a low significance value, P = 0.941, when MANOVA testing was conducted. 
The analysis results indicate scope and intensity are most influential on the total number 
of hearings post-crisis. Generally, in the case of acceleration of the number of hearings in 
particular, the value was consistently deemed insignificant. This is likely due that 
complex crises are heard over long durations with little fluctuation, such as climate 
                                                 
160 Jens Manuel Krogstad, Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, and Mark Hugo Lopez, “Children 12 and under Are 




change and immigration. Unlike the faster emerging sub-issues of global warming and 
unaccompanied children, which fall into the cluster of wicked problems, climate change 
and immigration are issues that have been heard over many years, compiling over 300 
and 600 hearings respectively. When outliers are removed, confidence levels increase 
from less than 70 percent to 95 percent, making the findings statistically significant.161 
Findings suggest the more widespread and intense social issues become, the more they 
impact congressional hearings. This is a finding that makes absolute sense when 
considering the emergence of the civil rights movement of the 1950s. An interesting 
proof will be the reaction to Congress to civil disturbances and police tactics emerging as 
this is written. If the issue continues to spread and continues to increase in intensity, there 
should be, if this thesis is correct, an episodic rise in attention by Congress to 
approximately five hearings annually, followed by a gradual decline and period of stasis.  
Data indicates the three clusters of crisis types, black swans, wicked problems, 
and complex social crises, are all influenced by the crises’ characteristics differently. In 
the case of black swans and complex social crises, the results are statistically significant. 
Thus, hypothesis 4 was confirmed and the null hypothesis rejected. 
5. Hypothesis 5  
Specific characteristic subsets of intensity such as number of fatalities and 
economic impacts cannot be correlated to an increase in the number of congressional 
hearings post-crisis. Because of the relatively frequent, yet seemingly unpredictable 
nature of natural disasters and also the frequency in which these disasters result in 
legislative proposals, this study looked at these crises in particular. Analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted for 18 major natural disasters occurring from 1945 to 2012 to 
determine whether the null hypothesis was valid. The analysis comparing economic loss 
and fatalities (independent variable) to number of congressional hearings (dependent 
variable) revealed a highly significant relationship to economic loss at a confidence level 
of P = 0.003. As the implications of broad economic impacts increases during the 
disaster, the degree of attention increases. This finding is consistent with post-disaster 
                                                 
161 P-value increase from P = 0.292 to P = 0.043. 
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models theorized by researchers at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which 
suggests a cascading of impacts after an event.162  
Univariate analysis revealed no significant relationship between fatalities and the 
number of congressional hearings.163 However, when outliers were removed from the 
data set, the F-value of fatalities and congressional hearings corrected to F = 65.7, P = 
0.097.164 Likewise, if the outlier is removed for the linear regression test of economic 
impacts and fatalities (I.V.) and number of hearings (D.V.) for natural disasters, the fit is 
confirmed as highly significant by a result of R = 0.621, ANOVA F = 4.41 (2/95), P = 
0.03. Findings indicate clearly that both economic impacts and fatalities influence the 
emergence of attention from Congress. Based on the above, hypothesis 5 was confirmed 
and the null hypothesis rejected.  
B. NATURAL DISASTERS 
The study on natural disasters is interesting because these events are seemingly 
random in their occurrences; yet, history portends future events. Major natural disasters, 
particularly those resulting in congressional attention, occur on average ≈5.4 years, based 
on historical data from 1945 to the present. Their frequency is somewhat predictable, 
falling naturally in an 80/20 distribution: 80 percent occurring within eight years of the 
previous, 20 percent within nine to 15 years.165 These findings are based on the major 
crises that result in legislative change. When these crises do occur, the number of 
congressional hearings following the event is approximately 11 annually. The decline of 
attention is very rapid, occurring in nearly all cases within one year and declining on 
average 67 percent from the previous year. Hurricane Katrina, representing the rare 
extreme crisis, took four years to decline. In the fifth year after Katrina, congressional 
                                                 
162 Yossi Sheffi and James B. Rice, “A Supply Chain View of the Resilient Enterprise,” MIT Sloan 
Management Review 47, no.1 (fall 2005): 42.    
163 T = 0.064, P = .950 
164 The outlier removed was Hurricane Katrina due to extreme reaction compared to all other natural 
disasters occurring over 70 years. 
165 Albert-László Barabási, Linked: How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and What It 
Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life (New York: Plume, 2003), 72.  
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attention on natural disasters was still higher than it had been at any point in the previous 
62 years.166 
Data was extracted from the Library of Congress from 1945 to 2012 on hearings 
relating to natural disasters, reviewing 564 hearing in total. Data was sorted by event 
name and event type as described in Chapter V.  
Dr. Thomas Birkland would be inclined to disagree that a catastrophe with no 
impact matters. However, each catastrophe contributes to the historical record of events 
and helps create the basis for future predictions of event likelihood. Therefore, it may be 
more likely every event matters. Punctuations in congressional attention resulting from 
natural disasters typically result in legislation of some form. In approximately 86 percent 
of the surges in attention from 1945 to 2012, legislation was passed commensurate with 
the crisis that preceded it—greater than eight in 10 occurrences.  
The plot in Figure 11 shows the number of congressional hearings per year from 
1945 to 2010. 
 
Figure 11.  Natural Disasters, 1945–2012 
Surges in congressional hearings are caused by a variety of events, from the Texas 
City explosion in 1954 to hurricanes and earthquakes. Occasionally floods and tornados 
cause an interest, but the reaction to more localized events appears to be slight. As shown 
in Figure 11, an increase in hearings on natural disasters occurs approximately every 
eight to 10 years, the highest emergence being after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The 
                                                 
166 This finding is extrapolated from data compiled from 1945 to 2010. Data compiled from 
University of Texas Austin.  
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next highest emergence was in 1990 after the Loma Prieta earthquake, followed by 
Hurricane Hugo, and the Plainfield tornado (29 fatalities, 353 injuries, $165M).167 
Most natural disasters are minor relative to the black swan, which garners 
substantial attention. The average number of hearings annually, dating back to 1942, 
when major natural disasters occur is between five and six with no more than 16 for a 
single occurrence. Black swans easily exceed 55 hearings. The question is, can we 
“predict” or anticipate the black swan events, and thus predict or anticipate congressional 
attention and legislative opportunity? From the data compiled in this thesis and based on 
the analysis and observations of this chapter, I would argue yes. Perhaps we still cannot 
predict where, but we can certainly make informed observations about when, and how 
impactful the event might prove to be. 
C. WHAT DOES THE DATA COMMUNICATE? 
Data clearly demonstrates variances in the value of emerging crises consistent 
with the number of congressional hearings heard on various crises and exhibits a 
statistically significant correlation between the value of specific clusters of crises and 
consequent emergent attention. From the data compiled in this thesis, the analysis 
indicates: 
1. Specific characteristics of crises, such as intensity, gestation, resources, 
size, and fault, do influence the emergence of congressional attention post-
crisis. 
2. Results indicate of the six characteristics of crises, only three of the six 
demonstrated statistical significance. Only one of the four—scope—
demonstrated high significance.  
3. Cause and intensity of the crisis have the least effect on congressional 
attention when evaluated independently of other characteristics. 
4. Crises classified as black swans more strongly influence emergence and 
total value of attention than more prolonged and complex crises, such as 
immigration and civil rights.  
                                                 
167 Gregg Greenough et al., “The Potential Impacts of Climate Variability and Change on Health 
Impacts of Extreme Weather Events in the United States,” Environmental Health Perspectives 109, no.2 
(2001):191–198, http://depts.washington.edu/envir202/Readings/Reading04.pdf.  
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5. Congressional attention after natural disasters more strongly correlates to 
the degree of economic impact but is also related to the number of 
fatalities caused by the occurrence.  
6. There is an 80 percent probability of a natural disaster occurring within 
3.6 years of the previous event that result in legislative change. 
7. After natural disasters, only in very rare cases does punctuated attention 
last more than two years before returning to pre-crisis levels. 
These findings are consistent with Dr. Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner’s thesis. In 
their work on problem emergence they note:  
Because different factors may come into play at different times, there may 
not be any simple relationship between indicators and policy action. The 
threshold for action…may change over time as the nature of the problem 
and the desirability of government action is debated.168  
They further cite the inherent complexity and implausibility of determining causality 
merely by examining the interactions among variables, noting, “More accurately, one 
comes to recognize the contingent and interactive nature of causality.”169 However, the 
strong correlation between the characteristics of a crisis and policy responses of 
government, as illustrated repeatedly throughout this thesis, suggest congressional 
attention is episodic and reactive. This is consistent with Gould’s theory of punctuated 





                                                 
168 Baumgartner and Jones, Agendas and Instability, 90.  
169 Ibid., 91. 
170 Gould, Punctuated Equilibrium. 41. 
171 Jones and Baumgartner, The Politics of Attention, 20.  
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. 
Dr. Carl Sagan172 
 
A. HYPOTHESIS 
This study began by posing the following supposition: There are specific 
variables that enable and accelerate the emergence of attention post-crisis and give an 
issue the power to compel change in public and political opinion. The hypotheses driving 
this inquiry will endeavor to demonstrate through a repeatable model a pattern in 
emerging crises of specific forces that some more strongly influence emerging problems 
than others. Research will deduce there are specific combinations of forces more likely to 
result or influence emergent issues than others.  
This hypothesis was further expanded into five additional hypotheses to 
demonstrate the interrelationship of characteristics of crises on issue-attention and 
emergence of congressional attention—what Kingdon terms the policy window. This 
method proposed to develop a numerical value-scale and to assign quantitative values in 
place of typical qualitative descriptors of crises.173 As described in Chapter VI, univariate 
and multivariate statistical analysis was conducted to demonstrate statistically significant 
relationships between the assigned characteristics of crises and the emergence of 
congressional attention. Findings of the analysis indicated with a high degree of 
confidence the relationship between the proposed characteristics, both the total 
emergence of congressional attention, and also the rate of emergence. Based on evidence, 
there now remains no question variables such as the size of an event, the intensity and 
rate of emergence, the resources it requires, and the cause and culpability all contribute to 
                                                 
172 Carl Sagan, The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark (New York: Ballantine, 
1997). 213. 
173 Selected crises were valuated using the following model proposed in Chapter I: T= m*A, where m 
= f(scope, intensity, time, resources, fault, cause), and A = (Vf-Vi)/time; Vf = n of hearings at initial 
emergence, Vf = n of hearings at height.  
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the emergence of the issue-attention cycle and subsequently the policy window post-
crisis.  
B. METHODOLOGY 
The study set out to demonstrate the truth of the hypothesis with a brief synopsis 
of the contemporary theories of political science and problem emergence, followed by a 
clear outline of these theories applied to the emergence of U.S. environmental policy. The 
predominant theories included incrementalism, social identity theory, triggering events, 
the issue-attention cycle, punctuated equilibrium, and the policy window. 
Next, this study examined in greater detail several of the more influential theories 
to the emergence of attention post-crisis, noted above. Theories, such as punctuation in 
government, the issue-attention cycle, and social identity theory, as demonstrated in 
Chapters II, III, and IV, underpin how crises are framed, how, and when attention 
emerges during and after crisis as well as the subsequent decline of attention paid to 
crises and their causes. The advance-decline indicator, a financial market predictive 
indicator, was tested for this thesis. It was developed and fitted to congressional hearings 
over time but was found to be impractical as a predictive tool of attention. However, the 
advance-decline indicator was beneficial when applied to congressional attention to 
discern patterns in attention to crisis. Its application to dissimilar crisis types 
demonstrated similar arrangements, principally each period of increased attention post-
crisis appears to last approximately three years before declining. Periods of significant 
punctuation (e.g., after Hurricane Katrina) are followed by approximately a five-year 
period of declination before normalizing. This validates the theory of punctuated 
equilibrium and incrementalism, as seen in periods of stasis in congressional attention, 
resting between heightened emergence of attention and subsequent legislation.  
The issue-attention cycle, the process by which crisis attention emerges and 
declines, reveals patterns in emergence and decline of public opinion that is repeatable 
across crisis types. As shown in Chapter IV, public attention concerning the war on 
terrorism and the war on drugs cycled in a near perfectly matching manner (refer to 
Figure 6). This is an unexpected pattern that appears repeatedly in episodic attention and 
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is seen in natural disasters, terrorism, civil unrest, and is identifiable at both macro 
(national) and micro (regional) levels. Patterns in social media relating to crisis indicate 
the same decline in attention to those above.174 When quantified into percentages, the 
decline tends to be on average 67 percent.175 It is reasonable to conclude issue-attention 
may initiate, function, and complete its cycle consistent with such theories as diffusion of 
innovation and decay theory. Although outside the specific focus of this thesis, there 
appears to be a naturally occurring pattern of attention in emergence and decline across 
crisis types, communication modes, and regardless of the size of geographic impact. This 
is a significant discovery worthy of further academic exploration as it has potential to 
elucidate not only when and to what degree, but why powerful issues decline from 
attention. 
Once established that congressional attention is indeed influenced by crises as 
they emerge, and the fact that not all crises warrant the same degree of attention, 
Chapters V and VI set out to successfully support the hypothesis questioning the 
characteristics of crises and their influence on subsequent attention. The problem of 
emerging attention was examined by applying Gerston’s qualitative characteristics, 
combined with other similar qualities, to a sample of 25 crises quantitatively. All 25 
crises were evaluated and analyzed, determining for each crisis the mathematical mean of 
congressional attention annually over its entire duration, how rapidly attention emerged, 
and the total number of hearings. This data was then compared against the assigned 
numerical value of the characteristics of each crisis. 
C. OUTCOME OF ANALYSIS 
1. When all crises in the sample were compared against their rate of 
emergence in a scatter plot, the 25 crises grouped into three distinct 
clusters: black swans, wicked problems, and social crises. The highest 
value cluster representing the top 20 percent of all crises in the sample. 
                                                 
174 Data is based on analysis of Tweets (#Ferguson) from August 9 to August 15, looking specifically 
at the night of August 13 through 15. Rather than percentage of a whole as was the measure in Figure 3, 
Tweets were measured in tweets per minute from 11:41pm, August 13 to 5:44am, August 15.  
175 Reference Figure 12. 
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2. As the characteristics of a crisis develop over time in their value (e.g., 
their intensity, the resource impacts), the degree of attention changes as in 
the case of immigration transitioning to a wicked problem, consequently 
increasing its degree of attention by over 400 percent, from approximately 
10 hearings annually to nearly 60 hearings annually. This alone validates 
the primary hypothesis of this thesis in that as the value of a crisis 
changes, so does the congressional attention.  
3. Hypothesis: H0 (null) = Specific characteristics, such as intensity, 
gestation, resources, size, and fault, do not have any influence on the 
emergence of congressional attention post-crisis. For the entire sampling 
of crises in this study, the null hypothesis was rejected; results were 
confirmed conducting an F-test with a 99 percent level of significance.176 
Therefore, it is conclusive there is a high statistical significance in findings 
between the characteristic values of crises and the emergence of attention. 
Secondary confirmation testing validated this result. 
4. Validation testing for black swans revealed a statistically significant 
correlation between the value of the crises’ characteristics, the total 
number, average number of congressional hearings, and the rate of 
acceleration of attention—rejecting the null hypothesis for H2. 
5. Correlation and significance were meaningfully higher than when included 
in the sample of all crises. This fact indicates clearly not all crises 
correlate in the same manner.  
6. MANOVA results indicate characteristics of crises affect black swans, 
wicked problems, and social crises each differently.  
7. The characteristics of intensity and cause alone are not as influential on 
emerging crises as other characteristics. 
8. Analysis indicates wicked problems are generally less affected by 
characteristics than social crises and black swans.  
9. A one way ANOVA indicates outliers have significant effects on the 
analysis of wicked problems and social crises. When outliers are removed, 
statistical results become far more significant in these categories. The F-
test for social crises strongly rejects the null hypothesis. Notwithstanding, 
the Pearson correlation demonstrates a moderate correlation between crisis 
value and attention as well as a statistically insignificant correlation 
between a crisis’ characteristics and acceleration. This is likely due to 
outliers such as climate change and immigration.  
10. There is relationship of high statistical significance between economic loss 
and natural disasters. Likewise, there is a statistically significant 
relationship, though to a slightly lesser degree, of fatalities to natural 
disasters. However, as noted in the analysis of all crises above, the 
                                                 
176 Reference Chapter VI.  
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intensity (degree of economic impact and fatalities) alone does not affect 
the crisis as strongly as when accompanied by other factors.  
11. Eight in 10 major natural disasters occur within eight years of a previous 
event, with only 20 percent of major natural disasters occurring greater 
than nine years from the previous. Of these occurrences, there is a high 
probability a major natural disaster resulting in significant congressional 
attention will occur at least once every 5.4 years. It is likely the number of 
hearings will total near 11, depending on the damage and number of 
fatalities among other factors. 
12. Each disaster attention-cycle lasts approximately two to three years. In 
nearly all cases, the decline in attention from its highest point will be ≈67 
percent from the previous year.  
Figure 12 illustrates the general construct of crises based on the findings of this 
thesis. The illustration is an approximation; it is based on the averages of the various 
types of crises studied in previous chapters. Although the decline and secondary 
emergence of attention does not occur in all cases, it occurs frequently enough and in the 
same manner and proportions that it is worth noting here. 
 
Figure 12.  Construction of Crisis Attention, Created May 8, 2015 
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D. IMPLICATIONS OF THESIS ON HOMELAND SECURITY 
Uncertainty is an uncomfortable position, but certainty is an absurd one. 
Voltaire 
This study has established that there is a relatively predictable cycle to political 
attention, which is generated, in many cases, by the characteristics and reactions to crises. 
The Department of Homeland Security is recent evidence of this reaction, similar to the 
New Deal in the 1930s, growth in defense after World War I and II, and the U.S. 
environmental programs of the 1960s. However, as Newton’s third law states, “to every 
action there is always opposed an equal reaction.”177 Public opinion has sharply faded on 
homeland security, particularly terrorism. The nation’s intense focus on post-9/11 
protection has been replaced by images of natural disasters, creating a change in focus to 
emergency management, preparation, and resilience. This decline may be the 
recognizable manifestation of Downs’s issue-attention cycle applied to homeland 
security. Once salient issues reach their dramatic climax, they become susceptible to 
being displaced from public attention (and the political agenda) by other newer dramas as 
they emerge—those of which we have more fully defined within the body of this study.  
This decline presents the larger challenge. A changing political landscape means 
potentially shifting priorities—these priorities are shifting to a new frontier of the war on 
terrorism as this is written. Cyber security has increased in prominence over recent years. 
The beginnings of a shift are occurring in cyber, a newly emerging field within homeland 
security marked by the creation of the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center. The 
Federal Information Security Management Agency, established in 2002 increased its 
already growing budget by 100 percent from 2009 to 2010 following Executive Order 
13636 and Presidential Policy Directive 21.178 Over the next three years, the agency’s 
budget continued to increase by $1.3B annually.179 With an event meeting our 
                                                 
177 Isaac Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (London: Reg. Soc. Press, 1686), 
16. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/28233/28233-pdf.pdf.  
178 Eli Dourado, “Federal Cybersecurity Breaches Mount Despite Increased Spending,” George 
Mason University, Mercatus Center, January 20, 2015, http://mercatus.org/publication/federal-
cybersecurity-breaches-mount-despite-increased-spending.  
179 Ibid.   
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requirements of the characteristics of a crisis,180 cyber will arguably represent the next 
punctuated growth in homeland security; however, like other issues cyber will likely 
wane in several years as new priorities emerge to displace it.  
In defining the patterns of episodic attention and political opportunity in crisis, 
there is an underlying ethical risk present. Significant crises often necessitate the re-
examination, re-assessment, and, in some cases, re-structuring of the status quo political 
arrangements. An acute understanding of the transfer of attention and punctuated shifts of 
policy can better enable the astute, savvy politician to influence the attention cycle for 
gain, or it may likely present opportunity to not invest where it may not appear to be 
lucrative to do so for the long term (i.e., there is no potential for growth or long-term 
political opportunity). Examples might include childhood obesity, civil rights, and social 
security reform. Issues of this kind, because of their lack of salience and power, are not 
likely to garner interest unless politically advantageous.181 It is generally accepted one 
cannot go against public opinion and expect to stay in democratic politics for long. It has 
been attributed to President Woodrow Wilson, a career statesman, who said the public 
sentiment is like the wind used by a sailing ship. The sailor can use it to power a voyage 
but cannot sail against it. Therefore, there is a risk created through this study that one 
might be more advantaged to align oneself with the emerging crisis likely to be most 
salient and repudiate those that are not.   
The more concise defining of reactive congressional attention enables anticipatory 
governance and thus limits reactive governance post-crisis. This key benefit of theoretical 
advancement establishes a control-measure in the current process of political agenda 
development as it pertains to the generation and acceptance of policy alternatives. 
Currently, political opportunism caused by reactive attention of Congress typically results 
in fertile opportunities for policy supporters to champion preferred solutions or attention 
to particular issues.182 It also provides opportunity for key political figures to initiate 
                                                 
180 An event of this nature may be similar to the OPM data breach in June 2015, which compromised 
the personal data of nearly 4.2 million Americans.  
181 Emily Sherman, “Candidates Ignoring Coming Social Security Crisis, Critics Say,” CNN, October 
23, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/23/social.security/index.html?iref=24hours.  
182 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 99. 
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punctuated growth of government. This feature of reactive governance is precisely what 
the theory of anticipatory governance is designed to prevent. Advocates of particular 
policy solutions know that when the policy window is open, it is open only for a short 
time.183 They also know the policy window is the sine qua non of money; where there is 
money, there is potential for shifts or shoring up of power. There is a conflict dynamic 
within the political reform craft by those within the elite intent on conservative reforms to 
protect status quo, and those intent on more liberal reform of institutional arrangements. 
Changes in policy goals, institutions, and polity settings influence revenue flow, thus 
influencing power distribution.184 
The future spectrum and landscape of homeland security and protection against 
terrorism, the cornerstone of the Department of Homeland Security, represents the terrae 
incognitae—the land of the unknown. Investing in the protection against unknown and 
unknowable threats provides a real challenge to homeland security professionals in 
articulating policy change from equilibrium. Dr. Adam Sheingate terms these investments 
“speculative acts of creativity.”185 These forced changes influence organizational 
structures, relationships and behaviors arguably for decades after the initiating event, 
acting as catalysts or, as Sabatier notes, “significant perturbations.”186 Homeland security 
professionals should become astute at understanding threats, measuring generally their 
often opaque environs, and most importantly articulating the value of investment in risk 
mitigation through resilience. 
To this end, this thesis establishes a pattern in emerging attention post-crisis with 
which legislators and agency officials can anticipate the emergence of the policy window. 
Crises with higher quantitative values elicit markedly higher degrees of congressional 
attention. For example, crises with high values in three of four characteristics will result 
                                                 
183 Ibid., 165–169. 
184 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is 
Almost Always Good Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 19. See also Boin, The Politics of Crisis 
Management, 122–123.    
185 Adam D. Sheingate, “Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American Political 
Development,” Studies in American Political Development 17, no. 2 (2003): 185–203.    
186 Anthony Bertelli and Peter John, Public Policy Investment: Priority-Setting and Conditional 
Representation in British Statecraft (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 22.   
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in nearly 50 percent more hearings annually than crises with characteristics totaling a 
lesser value.187 Furthermore, the research presented has made clearer the subject of issue-
attention. Through analysis, this study has validated findings that groupings of crises such 
as black swans, wicked problems, and socially complex and domestic crises result in 
varying degrees of congressional attention. Quantitative data on social and domestic/ 
regional crises indicate, for instance, the attention to these categories of crises lasts twice 
as long as wicked problems and black swans, yet is approximately 10 percent the number 
annually, with the median number of hearings each year between one and 15.  
This thesis has established a foundation to better understand the scope and 
duration of attention post-crisis. This understanding enables efforts to develop a model to 
support anticipatory governance of catastrophic events. Based on the data analysis in this 
study, it is clear events will continue to occur with regularity and that events are 
somewhat predictable in their scope and scale, as is legislative reaction to such crises. 
Using statistical analysis and probability models may help to clarify emergent crises or at 
least better define the problem space and second order effects of a catastrophe. In 
addition, they may help mitigate reactive governance that tends to occur as a result of 
emerging crises. This is an area continually deserving of more scholarly attention. The 
subject covered in this study is merely a foundation, yet it has shown the depths to which 
this subject can be mined. 
There are several areas regarding issue-attention that should be considered for 
further study. The duration of the issue-attention cycle and whether prolonged heightened 
awareness creates a proportionate increase in negative sentiment. Understanding the 
issue-attention cycle and its consequences will more fully aid emergency managers, 
response professionals, and presidential staff in preparing both short- and long-term risk 
management messaging and strategies. Strategic communications of this nature may be 
that which is communicated post-crisis intentionally to appropriately frame narratives of 
local and state officials, the public, and media. 
                                                 
187 Crises ranked high in three of four characteristics, totaling a value of 2.7, result in 49 percent more 
hearings than those less than 2.7.  
 84 
Defining the emergence, timing, and duration of the issue-attention cycle to more 
accurately predict the policy window. Although contemporary research does examine 
what contributes to the emergence of issues, quantifying the timing and duration of issue-
attention may prove a far more challenging task.188 Additional study should be 
undertaken to determine the re-emergence of the policy window without a triggering 
event. This dynamic is seen after most major crises, as noted in Figure 12, and relates to 
congressional attention as well as social media attention and public opinion polling.  
By accepting new theories on legislative attention resulting from problem 
emergence, especially theories that better establish what causes, shapes, and retains 
episodic attention, institutions will be challenged to react more predictably. The 
competing narratives in this effort will be those that suggest history cannot foretell 
anything about future events, nor can the reaction to previous unpredictable events 
portend anything about future behavior. This is erroneous, myopic thinking. Evidence 
reinforces, with a high degree of statistical significance, certain crises correlate strongly 
to specific reactions in legislature. As posited by Dr. Dana Meadows, thinking in terms of 
a systems structure is key to defining otherwise chaotic systems. She explains, “System 
structure is the source of system behavior. System behavior reveals itself as a series of 
events over time.”189 Her thesis suggests chaotic problems become less surprising when 
accumulated instances can be distilled into dynamic patterns of behavior.190 This is 
precisely what we have accomplished in this study. Event-event analysis (e.g., that one 
event correlates to another) reveals nothing of the why the system behaves in the manner 
it does. The core of this thesis on episodic attention seeks not only to define the roots of 
episodic attention post-crisis but also define the “system” behind the event. The chaotic 
event is not the sum of its parts:  
                                                 
188 This conclusion is based on the fact that issue-attention is human-based and therefore is inexact.  
189 Donella H. Meadows and Diana Wright, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (White River Junction, 
VT: Chelsea Green Pub., 2008), 80.  
190 Ibid., 88.  
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A whole, which is more than the sum of its parts, has something internal, 
some inwardness of structure and function, some specific inner relations, 
some internality of character of nature which constitutes that more.191 
Rather, there is much more to the crisis than what is immediately evident. As 
Meadows eloquently suggests, history reveals a great deal about the potential of future 
events and can serve to greatly reduce the degree of irrationality and uncertainty that the 
events of the terra incognita imbue. Employing systems models as theorized by Dr. 
Meadows, future research can define new theoretical models of episodic attention in 
Congress, examining the how powerful coalitions affect the dynamics of issue-attention 
and political opportunism. 
By having a more acute sense of the reaction of governance of particular 
emerging crises, one can better prepare messaging and the general construct of political 
agenda setting. More importantly, the more precise understanding of emerging problems 
aids in more completely defining the landscape of complex crises, thereby lessening the 
need for reactive governance. Rather, it allows for a more measured and proactive post-
crisis response. What would this look like in practice? Anticipatory governance goes to 
the theory of nineteenth century scholar of the English Constitution, Walter Bagehot. His 
theory of double government speaks to a bifurcated nature of governing. In double 
government, this is the division between the Madisonian governance (reactive 
congressional decision making resulting from emergent attention post-crisis), and 
Trumanism (departmental decision-making and programmatic development that is 
measured and guides legislative decision-making). The latter prevents reactive governing, 
which ultimately leads to anemic single-faceted regimes like the post-9/11 Department of 
Homeland Security.  
A better understanding of the economy of crisis, the probability, and the risks 
posed by a crisis to a community better allows for arguments of return on investment and 
intentional strategic messaging. By building a comprehensive landscape of a variety of 
dissimilar crises, one can see the patterns of attention emergence, calculate probability of 
occurrence and size of events, and develop programs that represent “over the horizon” 
                                                 
191 Jan Christian Smuts, Holism and Evolution (London: MacMillan and Co., 1926), 103. 
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preparedness and mitigation activities by investing in the necessary resilience needed to 
combat the ill effects of crisis. When the behavioral aspects of issue-attention post-crisis 
are known to decision makers, it should be more evident that an initiating event should 
not be needed to pressure change. This changes the requirements of Kingdon’s tenants; 
maybe even changes the notion of a policy window. The merit of this research transcends 
the organizational or political future of a single entity or specific stakeholder. Ideally, this 
work will provide a completely different lens through which to look at the dynamic of 
emerging crises and episodic attention, providing an opportunity to see things, understand 




APPENDIX. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS RESULTS 
RESULT DETAILS & 
CALCULATION FOR CRISIS VALUE 




∑ = 770 
Mean = 30.8 
∑(X - Mx)2 = SSx = 7916 
 
Y Values 
∑ = 632 
Mean = 25.28 
∑(Y - My)2 = SSy = 16505.04 
 
X and Y Combined 
N = 25 
∑(X - Mx)(Y - My) = 7736.4 
 
R Calculation 
r = ∑((X - My)(Y - Mx)) / 
√((SSx)(SSy)) 
 
r = 7736.4 / √((7916)(16505.04)) = 
0.6768 
 
Meta Numerics (cross-check) 
r = 0.6768  
 
RESULT DETAILS & 
CALCULATION FOR CRISIS VALUE 
V. AVERAGE (BLACK SWANS) 
 
Result Details & Calculation 
 
X Values 
∑ = 280 
Mean = 56 
∑(X - Mx)2 = SSx = 1416 
 
Y Values 
∑ = 279 
Mean = 55.8 
∑(Y - My)2 = SSy = 5610.8 
 
X and Y Combined 
N = 5 
∑(X - Mx)(Y - My) = 2570 
 
R Calculation 
r = ∑((X - My)(Y - Mx)) / 
√((SSx)(SSy)) 
 
r = 2570 / √((1416)(5610.8)) = 0.9118 
 
Meta Numerics (cross-check) 
r = 0.9118 
 
RESULT DETAILS & 
CALCULATION FOR BLACK 




∑ = 280 
Mean = 56 
∑(X - Mx)2 = SSx = 1416 
 
Y Values 
∑ = 601 
Mean = 120.2 
∑(Y - My)2 = SSy = 36720.8 
 
X and Y Combined 
N = 5 
∑(X - Mx)(Y - My) = 6184 
 
R Calculation 
r = ∑((X - My)(Y - Mx)) / 
√((SSx)(SSy)) 
 
r = 6184 / √((1416)(36720.8)) = 0.8576 
 
Meta Numerics (cross-check) 
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r = 0.8576 
RESULT DETAILS & 
CALCULATION FOR CRISIS VALUE 
V. ACCELERATION (BLACK 
SWANS) 
 
Result Details & Calculation 
 
X Values 
∑ = 280 
Mean = 56 
∑(X - Mx)2 = SSx = 1416 
 
Y Values 
∑ = 119.667 
Mean = 23.933 
∑(Y - My)2 = SSy = 37.2 
 
X and Y Combined 
N = 5 
∑(X - Mx)(Y - My) = -177.333 
 
R Calculation 
r = ∑((X - My)(Y - Mx)) / 
√((SSx)(SSy)) 
 
r = -177.333 / √((1416)(37.2)) = -0.7727 
 
Meta Numerics (cross-check) 
r = -0.7727 
 
RESULT DETAILS & 
CALCULATION FOR CRISIS VALUE 
V. TOTAL (WICKED PROBLEMS) 
 
Result Details & Calculation 
 
X Values 
∑ = 213 
Mean = 30.429 
∑(X - Mx)2 = SSx = 235.714 
 
Y Values 
∑ = 596 
Mean = 85.143 
∑(Y - My)2 = SSy = 69084.857 
 
X and Y Combined 
N = 7 
∑(X - Mx)(Y - My) = -1556.429 
 
R Calculation 
r = ∑((X - My)(Y - Mx)) / 
√((SSx)(SSy)) 
 
r = -1556.429 / √((235.714)(69084.857)) 
= -0.3857 
 
Meta Numerics (cross-check) 
r = -0.3857 
 
 
RESULT DETAILS & 
CALCULATION FOR CRISIS VALUE 




∑ = 213 
Mean = 30.429 
∑(X - Mx)2 = SSx = 235.714 
 
Y Values 
∑ = 123.367 
Mean = 17.624 
∑(Y - My)2 = SSy = 173.744 
 
X and Y Combined 
N = 7 
∑(X - Mx)(Y - My) = -52.938 
 
R Calculation 
r = ∑((X - My)(Y - Mx)) / 
√((SSx)(SSy)) 
 
r = -52.938 / √((235.714)(173.744)) = -
0.2616 
 
Meta Numerics (cross-check) 
r = -0.2616 
 89 
RESULT DETAILS & 
CALCULATION FOR CRISIS VALUE 
V. AVERAGE (WICKED PROBLEMS) 
 
X Values 
∑ = 213 
Mean = 30.429 
∑(X - Mx)2 = SSx = 235.714 
 
Y Values 
∑ = 224.733 
Mean = 32.105 
∑(Y - My)2 = SSy = 2216.328 
 
X and Y Combined 
N = 7 
∑(X - Mx)(Y - My) = -295.448 
 
R Calculation 
r = ∑((X - My)(Y - Mx)) / 
√((SSx)(SSy)) 
 
r = -295.448 / √((235.714)(2216.328)) = 
-0.4088 
 
Meta Numerics (cross-check) 
r = -0.4088 
 
RESULT DETAILS & 
CALCULATION FOR CRISIS VALUE 




∑ = 277 
Mean = 21.308 
∑(X - Mx)2 = SSx = 1916.769 
 
Y Values 
∑ = 1393 
Mean = 107.154 
∑(Y - My)2 = SSy = 460135.692 
 
X and Y Combined 
N = 13 
∑(X - Mx)(Y - My) = -14134.615 
 
R Calculation 
r = ∑((X - My)(Y - Mx)) / 
√((SSx)(SSy)) 
 
r = -14134.615 / 
√((1916.769)(460135.692)) = -0.4759 
 
Meta Numerics (cross-check) 
r = -0.4759 
 
RESULT DETAILS & 
CALCULATION FOR CRISIS VALUE 




∑ = 277 
Mean = 21.308 
∑(X - Mx)2 = SSx = 1916.769 
 
Y Values 
∑ = 127.777 
Mean = 9.829 
∑(Y - My)2 = SSy = 665.354 
 
X and Y Combined 
N = 13 
∑(X - Mx)(Y - My) = -244.504 
 
R Calculation 
r = ∑((X - My)(Y - Mx)) / 
√((SSx)(SSy)) 
 
r = -244.504 / √((1916.769)(665.354)) = 
-0.2165 
 
Meta Numerics (cross-check) 







RESULT DETAILS & 
CALCULATION FOR CRISIS VALUE 




∑ = 277 
Mean = 21.308 
∑(X - Mx)2 = SSx = 1916.769 
 
Y Values 
∑ = 54.179 
Mean = 4.168 
∑(Y - My)2 = SSy = 261.691 
 
X and Y Combined 
N = 13 
∑(X - Mx)(Y - My) = -52.927 
 
R Calculation 
r = ∑((X - My)(Y - Mx)) / 
√((SSx)(SSy)) 
 
r = -52.927 / √((1916.769)(261.691)) = -
0.0747 
 
Meta Numerics (cross-check) 
r = -0.0747 
 
NAT. DISASTERS W/OUT KATRINA- 
RESULT DETAILS & 




∑ = 234.7 
Mean = 13.806 
∑(X - Mx)2 = SSx = 4790.649 
 
Y Values 
∑ = 73 
Mean = 4.294 
∑(Y - My)2 = SSy = 493.529 
 
X and Y Combined 
N = 17 
∑(X - Mx)(Y - My) = 955.471 
 
R Calculation 
r = ∑((X - My)(Y - Mx)) / 
√((SSx)(SSy)) 
 
r = 955.471 / √((4790.649)(493.529)) = 
0.6214 
 
Meta Numerics (cross-check) 
r = 0.6214 
 
NAT. DISASTERS, W/ KATRINA, 
RESULT DETAILS & 




∑ = 318.7 
Mean = 17.706 
∑(X - Mx)2 = SSx = 9444.129 
 
Y Values 
∑ = 220 
Mean = 12.222 
∑(Y - My)2 = SSy = 19727.111 
 
X and Y Combined 
N = 18 
∑(X - Mx)(Y - My) = 10416.078 
 
R Calculation 
r = ∑((X - My)(Y - Mx)) / 
√((SSx)(SSy)) 
 
r = 10416.078 / 
√((9444.129)(19727.111)) = 0.7631 
 
Meta Numerics (cross-check) 






NAT. DISASTERS, W/ KATRINA, 
RESULT DETAILS & 




∑ = 220 
Mean = 12.222 
∑(X - Mx)2 = SSx = 19727.111 
 
Y Values 
∑ = 3430 
Mean = 190.556 
∑(Y - My)2 = SSy = 3022308.444 
 
X and Y Combined 
N = 18 
∑(X - Mx)(Y - My) = 235405.778 
 
R Calculation 
r = ∑((X - My)(Y - Mx)) / 
√((SSx)(SSy)) 
 
r = 235405.778 / 
√((19727.111)(3022308.444)) = 0.9641 
 
Meta Numerics (cross-check) 
r = 0.9641 
 
NAT. DISASTERS, W/OUT 
KATRINA, RESULT DETAILS & 




∑ = 73 
Mean = 4.294 
∑(X - Mx)2 = SSx = 493.529 
 
Y Values 
∑ = 1594 
Mean = 93.765 
∑(Y - My)2 = SSy = 155557.059 
 
X and Y Combined 
N = 17 
∑(X - Mx)(Y - My) = 591.176 
 
R Calculation 
r = ∑((X - My)(Y - Mx)) / 
√((SSx)(SSy)) 
 
r = 591.176 / √((493.529)(155557.059)) 
= 0.0675 
 
Meta Numerics (cross-check) 



















Table 9.   Multivariate Analysis of Variance—25 Crises 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept Pillai’s Trace .993 150.550b 2.000 2.000 .007 
Wilks’ Lambda .007 150.550b 2.000 2.000 .007 
Hotelling’s Trace 150.550 150.550b 2.000 2.000 .007 
Roy’s Largest Root 150.550 150.550b 2.000 2.000 .007 
Scope Pillai’s Trace 1.155 2.052 4.000 6.000 .206 
Wilks’ Lambda .004 14.408b 4.000 4.000 .012 
Hotelling’s Trace 198.521 49.630 4.000 2.000 .020 
Roy’s Largest Root 198.330 297.495c 2.000 3.000 .000 
Intensity Pillai’s Trace 1.495 4.440 4.000 6.000 .052 
Wilks’ Lambda .057 3.174b 4.000 4.000 .145 
Hotelling’s Trace 6.798 1.699 4.000 2.000 .403 
Roy’s Largest Root 4.789 7.183c 2.000 3.000 .072 
Timing Pillai’s Trace 1.101 1.836 4.000 6.000 .241 
Wilks’ Lambda .030 4.771b 4.000 4.000 .080 
Hotelling’s Trace 27.955 6.989 4.000 2.000 .129 
Roy’s Largest Root 27.798 41.697c 2.000 3.000 .006 
Resource Pillai’s Trace 1.710 8.847 4.000 6.000 .011 
Wilks’ Lambda .020 6.030b 4.000 4.000 .054 
Hotelling’s Trace 12.328 3.082 4.000 2.000 .260 
Roy’s Largest Root 7.543 11.315c 2.000 3.000 .040 
Cause Pillai’s Trace .948 1.352 4.000 6.000 .352 
Wilks’ Lambda .085 2.431b 4.000 4.000 .205 
Hotelling’s Trace 10.379 2.595 4.000 2.000 .297 
Roy’s Largest Root 10.341 15.512c 2.000 3.000 .026 
Fault Pillai’s Trace .974 37.369b 2.000 2.000 .026 
Wilks’ Lambda .026 37.369b 2.000 2.000 .026 
Hotelling’s Trace 37.369 37.369b 2.000 2.000 .026 








Table 10.   MANOVA—Total Crisis Value to Total Hearings, Acceleration, 
Average; 25 Crises 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept Pillai’s Trace .952 19.724b 3.000 3.000 .018 
Wilks’ Lambda .048 19.724b 3.000 3.000 .018 
Hotelling’s Trace 19.724 19.724b 3.000 3.000 .018 
Roy’s Largest Root 19.724 19.724b 3.000 3.000 .018 
T Pillai’s Trace 2.549 1.569 54.000 15.000 .169 
Wilks’ Lambda .000 4.042 54.000 9.755 .011 
Hotelling’s Trace 598.014 18.457 54.000 5.000 .002 
Roy’s Largest Root 590.916 164.143c 18.000 5.000 .000 
Table 11.   MANOVA—Total Crisis Value to Total Hearings, Acceleration, 
Average; Black Swans 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept Pillai’s Trace 1.000 7439.320b 1.000 1.000 .007 
Wilks’ Lambda .000 7439.320b 1.000 1.000 .007 
Hotelling’s Trace 7439.320 7439.320b 1.000 1.000 .007 
Roy’s Largest Root 7439.320 7439.320b 1.000 1.000 .007 
T Pillai’s Trace 1.000 978.888b 3.000 1.000 .023 
Wilks’ Lambda .000 978.888b 3.000 1.000 .023 
Hotelling’s Trace 2936.664 978.888b 3.000 1.000 .023 
Roy’s Largest Root 2936.664 978.888b 3.000 1.000 .023 
Table 12.   MANOVA—Average, Total, and Acceleration; Wicked Problems 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept Pillai’s Trace .984 59.798b 1.000 1.000 .082 
Wilks’ Lambda .016 59.798b 1.000 1.000 .082 
Hotelling’s Trace 59.798 59.798b 1.000 1.000 .082 
Roy’s Largest Root 59.798 59.798b 1.000 1.000 .082 
T Pillai’s Trace .995 16.983b 11.000 1.000 .187 
Wilks’ Lambda .005 16.983b 11.000 1.000 .187 
Hotelling’s Trace 186.810 16.983b 11.000 1.000 .187 
Roy’s Largest Root 186.810 16.983b 11.000 1.000 .187 
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Table 13.   MANOVA—Total Crisis Value to Total Hearings, Acceleration, 
Average; Social and Domestic Problems 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept Pillai’s Trace .485 .942b 1.000 1.000 .510 
Wilks’ Lambda .515 .942b 1.000 1.000 .510 
Hotelling’s Trace .942 .942b 1.000 1.000 .510 
Roy’s Largest Root .942 .942b 1.000 1.000 .510 
T Pillai’s Trace .457 .168b 5.000 1.000 .941 
Wilks’ Lambda .543 .168b 5.000 1.000 .941 
Hotelling’s Trace .840 .168b 5.000 1.000 .941 
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